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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VERNON S . CHEEVER, MARTHA
T. CHEEVER, UTAH COUNTY
PACKING COMPANY, I N C . , and
COLES BROTHERS, I N C . ,

No.

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

20,362

vs.
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, MYRA
K. SEETHALER, and SECURITY
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

In responding to BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS Appellants will follow
the format of the Respondent's Brief.

All references will be to

the numbered pages of the Respondent's Brief unless otherwise
stated.
STATEMENT'OF FACTS/NATURE OF CASE
On page 3, paragraph 1, it is a misstatement of fact that
"as president of Utah County Packing, Vernon Cheever achieved a
compromise with Seethaler in the price of the accounts receivable
to off-set the equipment failures".

The true fact is that they

were having ongoing negotiations but there never was a "compromise"
(see Affidavit of VERNON CHEEVER, Exhibit 9 and Affidavit of BRUCE
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COLES, Exhibit 11, of Appellant Brief.)
Beginning the last paragraph of page 3 the Respondents claim
that the Appellants action is an "...action seeking an injunction...".
That is not the case, Appellants THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT, (a copy
of which is incorporated in this Brief as Exhibit 7, was inadvertantly omitted from Appellants Brief) has several causes of action.
The FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION is to have the Note and Deed of Trust
reformed to be only in the amount of $25,000.00 and not $371,750.00.
The SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION seeks a complete recession of the documents by reason of fraud.
On the last five lines of page 8 of Respondent's Brief they
allege that the "Court ruled that the principal, Utah County Packing,
after discovering all the facts upon which it now complained, had
ratified or affirmed the contract between the buyer and the seller."
Respondent does not say where in the record that occurs

but even

if it does occur it is not possible because the Court is ruling on
a "question of fact" which is not proper on Summary Judgment.

Further,

the Affidavit of VERNON CHEEVER, Exhibit 9 of Appellant's Brief
and of BRUCE COLES, Exhibit 11 of Appellant's Brief, are to the contrary.

Those Affidavits clearly show that a question of fact

still

existed.
In the middle of page 9 of Respondent's Brief, the Respondent
states as follows:
The Court further found that the Plaintiffs Complaint
did not state a cause of action for fraud and that
the Defendant had admitted that any claim by Utah
County Packing is barred by the statute of limitations.

-2-

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS1 POINTS
POINT I
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF DOES NOT MEET THE STANDARDS
SET FORTH BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND APPELLANTS1
CASE, AS STATED, CANNOT PREVAIL UPON APPEAL.
Respondent's POINT I,

is not well taken, Appellant's Brief

shows that Appellant argued all of the Respondent's Points in its'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (See Exhibit 4 of Appellants Brief).
The arguments on the four points

are contained in Appellant's

Brief at page 9 et al. Other arguments are also incorporated.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT UTAH
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WERE
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES.
Under POINT II, Respondents, on page 16, state as follows:
One of the basis for that Ruling was that the cause
of action for fraud, if any, belonged to the corporation, and not to the individual plaintiffs.
Before analyzing other incorrect positions of the Respondent,
it should be made very clear that UTAH COUNTY PACKING/ had a cause
of action for fraud on its "contract" for the purchase of the meat
packing business.

That cause of action is a seperate and distinct

cause of action apart from the cause of action that the CHEEVERS
had.

Their cause of action are set forth in the FIRST CAUSE OF

ACTION, and SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION of the THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Exhibit 7, filed herein and inadvertantly omitted from Appellant's
Brief.).

The cause of action of CHEEVERS has nothing to do with

the purchase of the business.

Their cause of action is to have de-
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clared of no force and effect the TRUST DEED NOTE, and DEED OF TRUST
Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 of Appellant's Brief at page 28 and 29 therein.

The Trust Deed is on their residence.
Next is

the statement by the Respondents on page 17 of their

Brief
Utah County Packing Company has, therefore, elected to
affirm the Contract and has waived any claim for damages.
Appellant asserts that it wouldn't matter whether or not Utah
County Packing Company elected to affirm their contract or not.
That contract has nothing to do with the Appellants causes of action
to have the TRUST DEED NOTE and DEED OF TRUST, declared of no force
and effect. Utah County Packing never signed the Deed of Trust.
Also in the middle of page 17 of their Brief they state that
there was an "accord and satisfaction".

That is not true.

That

would require a finding of fact on the part of the trial court which
would not be possible upon Stimmary Judgment. (See Exhibit 9 and 11
of Appellant's Brief.)
In the next to the last paragraph of page 17 of Respondent's
Brief they allege:
Where the existing plaintiff has failed to join other
necessary plaintiffs, the entire case must be dismissed.
Appellant does not see the rational of this argument. The
record is crystal clear that they were properly joined. (See THIRD
AMENDED C O M P L A I N T , Exhibit 7 herein, showing their having been joined,
R. 516-549;
Exhibits

for the authority of having them joined see

1 3 , 1 4 , and 15 of APPELLANT'S BRIEF.)

Finally in disposing of Respondent's POINT II, the Appellants
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asks, So what?

The Record is clear that they were joined.
POINT III

AS CONCEDED BY APPELLANTS, ANY ACTION BY UTAH
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WAS BARRED
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Respondent's arguments herein are also MOOT.

They were joined

and its conceded that apparently that they were barred by the
applicable Statute of Limitations.

The effect of them being barred,

satisfied the very need for joining "indispensable parties".

That

reason is to have a final determination as to all of the issues regarding those "indispensable parties"; the issues are finally resolved,' this is particularly true in the fact that no appeal has
been taken on those corporate "indispensable parties" and they
cannot be of any hazard to the Respondents.
Throughout POINT III, there is also again the assertion that
the claim of Utah County Packing Company had been

"waived".

Of course that is not true. (See Exhibit 9 and 11 of Appellant's
Brief.)
POINT IV
CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND GUARANTOR, HAD NO
STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION FOR RESCISSION WHEN ANY
ALLEGED DAMAGE WAS DONE TO UTAH COUNTY PACKING/COLES
BROTHERS AND CHEEVER, AS PRESIDENT OF UTAH COUNTY
PACKING ELECTED TO SEEK DAMAGES, AND THROUGH
COMPROMISE TO AFFIRM AND RATIFY THE CONTRACT.
Again, it is absolutly essential that it be understoood that
the cause of action of the Appellants has nothing to do with the
purchase of the Meat Pacing plant by Utah County Packing Company
from the Defendants but has to do with the Plaintiffs rights as a
guarantor.

Their rights having nothing to do with the purchase of
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the meat packing plant.

Their rights are independent of any actions

or rights of Utah County Packing.
On the bottom of page 23 of the Respondents Brief they talk
about the "principle obligation".

The "principle obligation" in

this case is the obligation between the defendants and Utah Count?
Packing.

The "principle obligation" has nothing to do with the

"independent

rights" of the Appellants, who are guarantors.

At

the top of page 24 Respondents state: "a guarantor may assert all
defenses, with the exception of personal defenses available to the
principle."

A reading of that case indicates that the "principle

defenses" are the defenses such as "infancy and incapacity".

The

Respondents are correct; the Guarantors, the Appellants, can
raise any defenses that they have.
In SUMITOMO BANK OF CALIFORNIA v IWASAKI 447 P2d 956, 959, the
Court stated:
In all suretyship relations, the creditor owes to the
surety a duty of continuous good faith and fair dealing. (County of Glenn v. Jones (1905) 146 Cal. 518,
520, 80 P. 695; Ely v. Liscomb (1914) 24 Cal.App. 244,
228, 140 P. 1086; Hamlen v. Rednalloh Co. (1935) 291
Mass. 119, 197 N.E. 149, 153, 99 A.L.R. 1230; First
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Utica v. Shermans Estate
(1937) 250 App.Div. 339, 294 N.Y.S. 131, 139; Stearns,
The Law of Suretyship (5th ed. 19 51) §2.11, at p.
22; 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th ed. 1918)
§ 448, at p. 430.) Thus, the cr€>ditor must not misrepresent or conceal facts so as to induce or permit
the surety to enter or continue in the relationship
in reliance on a false impression as to the nature
of the risk. As with other contracts, a creditor's
fraud, which may consist of intentional or negligent misrepresentation C- active suppression of
the truth, will discharge the surety as to any subsequently incurred liability. (Arant, Law of Suretyship and Guaranty (19 31 § 28, at p. 75; 1 Brandt,
The Law of Suretyship and Guaranty (3rd ed. 19 05)
§ 256, at p. 505; cf. 1 Corbin on Contracts (1963)
§ 6, at pp. 12-13.)(page 959.)
That rule imposes an absolute duty upon the obligee
-6-

to volunteer disclosure of all facts materially
affecting the risk to the surety on a fidelity
bond
Irrespective of motive or intent,
mere non-disclosure of facts known by the obligee
which materially affect the surety's risk, such as
prior dishonesty of the principal on the fidelity
bond, therefore discharges the surety, (page 960)
The same concept is set forth in SURETYSHIP, 74 AM JUR 2d,
91:
Hence the slightest fraud on the part of the creditor
touching the contract, annuls it. Accourdingly,
it has been said that if a creditor induces a surety
to enter into the contract of suretyship by any
fraudulent concealment of material facts, or by any
express or implied misrepresentations of such facts
or by taking any undue advantage of surety, either
by surprise or by withholding proper information,
there will be afforded a sufficient ground for the
invalidation of the contract.
It should also be noted that because of the special relationship of Guarantor or Suretyship, that there be no necessity of any
"positive affirmations".
Fraud on the part of the obligee such as will avoid
the contract of suretyship is not confined to positive affirmations which are untrue, but may consist
in the concealment or withholding by him from the
surety, at the time the contract of suretyship is
executed, of material facts affecting the risk,
which contract of suretyship is executed, of
material facts affecting the risk, which facts the
obligee has the opportunity, and which it is his
duty, to disclose
However, if, in the circumstances, the concealment is fraudulent, the
motive of the obligee is immaterial. (74 Am Jur 2d 92)
The ETTLINGER

citation, bottom of page 24 of Respondent's

Brief, is not in point.

The "contract induced by fraud" referred

to on the top of page 25 is referring, in this instance, to the
"contract"for the purchase of the meat packing plant by Utah County
Packing.

We are not concerned with that contract? we are concerned

with the contract of SURETYSHIP that is set forth in Exhibit 1 and
2 of the Appellantfs Brief.

That is the contract that was incurred
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fraud/ those are the contracts that privy

only to the Appellants.

Those contracts. Exhibit 1 and 2 have nothing to do with Utah County
Packing.
On page 27 of Respondent's Brief, they claim that "

any

representations were made exclusively to the president of Utah
Packing Company, and the plaintiffs, as guarantors, are without
standing to assert the claims or defenses of Utah Packing Company."
That is not true!

The false representations were made to the Pres-

ident of Utah County Packing Company, but they were also made to the
individual, Vernon Cheever.

For the "seperate entity" doctrine, see

page 20-23 of Appellant's Brief.

Respondents would have us believe

that like a stick of dynamite exploding, that it can only hurt one
person; in this instance Vernon Cheever, President of Utah County
Packing Company.

The "exploding dynamite" are the fradulent repre-

sentations made by Seethaler, (see particularly the Affidavit of
ARLIN DAVIS, Exhibit 21, page 90 of Appellant's Brief.) Cheever, as
a personal guarantor heard it explode.
On page 2 8 of Respondent's Brief the statement is made:
The point of the Court's decision in this case is that
Wilkerson,(citing-FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA v.
PRUDENTIAL CARBON AND RIBBON COMPANY, 507 P2d 1026, Utah
1973,) the guarantor, could not raise a defense that
had vested in the debtor.
That is true!

Appellants are not raising the defense that

had vested in the debtor (Utah County Packing) but rather the defense
that had vested in the Appellants, the fraud committed on them in
getting them to execute Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 of Appellant's Brief.
Finally on page 29 the Respondents would have us believe that
the Appellants herein do not have "standing".

Attached hereto as

Exhibit 1, is the complete text of JUNGK vs. HOLBROOK (emphasis added).
See also page 6 and 7 of this Brief.
-8-

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT REACHING
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD IN THAT THE CORPORATIONS
WERE BARRED AND CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, COULD
NOT SEEK A REMEDY IN CONTRAST TO THAT SOUGHT
AS A CORPORATE OFFICER; IN ANY EVENT, WHERE
A GUARANTOR EXERCISING PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE
AS TO BUSINESS OPERATIONS INHERENT TO THE
CONTRACT, INSPECTS PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE CONTRACT,
THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR APPLIES AND RELIANCE
UPON THE OPINIONS OF THE SELLER ARE UNJUSTIFIED.
All of Respondent's Arguments and cases under POINT V are inappropriate

because they all relate to "questions of fact" which

are to be determined at the time of trial and not by Summary Judgment,
the basis of the appeal herein.

Again, Appellant refers the Court

to'the Affidavit of Arlin Davis, Exhibit 21, page 90 of Appellant's
Brief. See also page 6-8 herein.
POINT VI
EVEN WERE CHEEVER PERMITTED TO BRING A
SEPARATE ACTION AS GUARANTOR, HIS ALLEGATIONS OF
MISTAKE AS TO THE TRUST DEED FAILED TO ESTABLISH
A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR RESCISSION.
See p. 6-8 herein.
POINT VII
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
BY REASON OF APPELLANTS' FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.
Somebody ought to pay attorneys fees here when there is 815
pages of pagenated record and the case is decided on Summary Judgment.
APPELLANT, MRS. CHEEVER
The thrust of all of these arguments raised by the Respondents
have to do with spurious defenses that attempts to keep this case
going to

a Jury Trial.

There is nothing in the record to indicate
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that Mrs. Cheever was involved in any of these "compromises",
"waivers", or "settlements".
STIPULATED ADDITION TO BRIEF
Attached hereto, as Exhibit F, is the Stipulation entered
into by Appellants and Respondents for addition to Briefs filed
herein.
Subsequent to the filing of the Brief herein, the Respondents
sold the Appellants property pursuant to Notice of Trustee's Sale,
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, on the 9th day
of April, 1985 at 11:00 a.m., as more fully set forth by the
Trustee's Deed, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Since the filing of appellants Brief, a new item

of relief

is sought in order to facilitate a final conclusion to this matter.
Appellant is fearful that if they are successful in this
appeal that a remand to the Lower Court may result in the Lower
Court refusing to allow amendment to the Pleadings to remove the
"cloud" on the title of the Appellants by reason of Exhibit B if
the Appellants are also successful in the cause of action in the
Lower Court.
Page 26 should be substituted so that if the Appellants are
successful in this Court, a remand will facilitate a "final disposition" without the expense and necessity of an additional
appeal on the issue as to whether or not Appellant would be entitled
to have the "cloud" removed if also successful in the Lower Court
on remand on the original cause of action.
The right of Quiet Title would also effect the right to Quiet
Title against any persons taking by reason of the Defendants Deed,
-10-

Exhibit B.

This necessarily follows by reason of the fact that

Appellants, filed a Lis Pendens on the 29th day of February, 1984
as set forth in Ehxibit C.

Pursuant to the holding in HIDDEN MEA-

DOWS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. MILLS 590 P2d 1244, (Utah, 1979),
the filing of Exhibit C had the effect of giving Notice to the
world of Appellants Cause of Action. A copy of the complete
text is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

Also attached hereto is

Exhibit D, Amended Lis Pendens, which gives notice to the world
that there is an active pending case even though Summary Judgment
was entered against the Plaintiffs and in favor of the Defendants
on the 30th day of November, 19 84.
Exhibit D.)

(See bottom of page 2 of

It should be noted that Exhibit D was not really nec-

essary for the reason thfct HIDDEN MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs.
MILLS, stands for the proposition that the Lis Pendens filed in
the first instance survives the Appeal.

The Court stated:

The rule is well settled that, where a judgment
is reversed and remanded with specific instruction or directions, the case stands in lower
Court precisely as it did before a trial was
had in the first instance. Hence, that very situation existed in the instant case as a result
of our reversal and remand with directions to
grant specific performance. Also, by so reversing, the Court has already recognized the
full effectiveness of lis pendens pending appeal,
(page 1248)
For the reasons cited,

this Court should allow the substi-

tution of page 26 in Appellants Brief and these arguments set
forth herein should become a part of the Brief for the proposition
that if the Appellants are successful on their Appeal herein,
that the relief sought herein should include instructions to the
Lower Court to follow the principles of law set forth in this
Memorandum , page 9 and 10.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court should rule that Summary
Judgment, was improperly granted, and the judgment of Lower
Court reversed with all causes of action in place and that
the Lower Court should seriously look to determining if the prevailing party should be awarded Attorney Fees pursuant to
Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code.
That in the event the Appellants are successful on Appeal,
tk&t Plaintiffs be allowed to file a Cause of Action for damages for the loss of the use of their property and for quieting
Title to the Property in Plaintiffs by allowing amendments to
Plaintiffs pleadings.
DATED this /^> day of Hay, 19 85.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

KENNETH F, CLARKE
:torney for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on N^ie_/^day of May, 1985, ten tri/e
PLY BRIEF
BKTEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed
and correct copies of the REPLY
to the Supreme Court and four true and correct copies of tile
same were mailed, postage prepaid, to JACKSON-HOWARD, H9* ard,
Lewis & Peterson, 120 East 300 North, Proved; Utah 846(

KENNETH F. CLARKE
MADSEN, JEPSON, SALLENBACK & CLARKE
Attorney at Law
One East Center, Suite 300
P. 0. Box H
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone 801-375-2911
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VERNON S . CHEEVER and MARTHA T.
CHEEVER, husband and w i f e , UTAH
COUNTY. PACKING ItfC.V'a- Utah
C o r p o r a t i o n j C<tf,FSS BROTHERS, I N C . ,

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOSEPH A. SESTHALER and MYRA
K. SEETHALER, husband and wife
and SECURITY TITLE AND ABSTRACT
COMPANY,

Civil No. 64179

Defendants.
/

COME NOW the Plaintiffs, VERNON S. CHEEVER and MARTHA
T. CHEEVER, and for cause of action against the Defendants, complain and allege as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

That on or about the 10th day of June, 1981, the Plain-

tiff, VERNON S. CHEEVER, individually, executed a TRUST DEED NOTE'
wherein the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER,
were payees; a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part

' j
{

hereof as if set forth herein at length and marked as Exhibit "A".)'
2.

That on or about the 10th day of June, 1981, the Plain-

tiffs, VERNON S. CHEEVER and MARTHA T. CHEEVER, executed a DEED OF
TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, wherein the Defendants, JOSEPH £.
SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHLAER are listed as beneficiaries; a
copy of which is attached hereto and m-ade a part hereof as if set
forth, herein-at length and marked as Exhibit "3".

3. That prior to the presentation of Exhibit "A" and "B" to the Plaintiffs,
the Plaintiff, VERKN S. CHEEVER, had agreed with the Defendants, that he would
be personally liable for the purchase from the Defendants, a neat packing
business, limited to the extent of $25,000.00; that i t was the intent of the
Plaintiffs and the Defendants that the individual liability of the Plaintiffs
and the giving of collateral to secure that liability was to be 1 ivn*** to the
extant of $25,000.00; the particulars of which are set forth on Exhibit D, attached
hereto based upon reasonable belief.
4. That the Plaintiff, at the tine of the execution of Exhibits "A" and
"B", did not read the couLeuLs thereof before signing the same but relied upon
the representation of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR, that the said
Exhibits did contain the express agieaueuL of the parties theretofore agreed to,
and the Plaintiffs did believe, based upon the said representation of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAUSl, which representation was material and which was
false, that the said ubcuusnts did contain the agieMienl of the parties theretofore agreed to*
5. In fact, the documents referred to herein as Exhibits "A" and *B" did
not contain the IMJL ••it. of toe parties theretofore agreed to, but in fact,
onrrtviinert terms entirely contrary to the expressed agreement of the parties,
which fact was known to the said Defendant, and to the said defendants agent.
Defendant, SBCDRXW TTHZ MID ABSTRACT COWMW, who prepared the said documents,
or, if said fact was not known by Defendant, JCSBPWA. SEETHAIER, constituted a
mistake of fact en the pert of said Defendant in executing Exhibits "A" and "B".
6. The Defendants *»"«* to disclose to the Plaintiffs the material
differences between the documents referred to herein as Exhibits "A- and "B"
and the actual agreement entered into by the parties prior to execution of
Exhibits "A- and "B".
7. That by reason of the mutual mistake of the Plaintiffs and the

Defendants, or by reason of the mistake of the Plaintiff or ignorance as to
the contents of Ratfuhits "A" and "Ba, coupled with the fraud or material
Bdsrapcesentation of the Defendants in concealing their knowledge of the
contents thereof. Exhibits "A* and *B" ccnpletely failed to embody the actual
a^seaspt of the parties; with liability of the Plaintiff, VEWCN S. OEEvER,
Individually, was to be limited to $25,000.00 on Exhibit "A" and the collateral,
the residence of the Plaintiffs* was given only to secure the individual
liability of the Plaintiffs to the extent of $25,000.00 and Exhibit "B" should
have been a second trust deed to the Defendants in the anoint of $25,000.00 and
no s o n , subject to a first trust deed in favor of any entity of Plaintiffs
choosing at any tine in the anount of $44,000.00.
8. That the Plaintiffs executed Exhibits "A" and "B" in the belief that
the sam^ embodied the actual a^ieauent theretofore made as hereinabove alleged.
9. That by reason of the fraud of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEEXBAIZR,
who acted at all times as agent for his wife, MESA K. SEEB&AER, the Plaintiffs
have suffered great distress of body and mind and greatly injured and danwjpri
in their credit standing and reputation by reason of the Defendants' acts in
the asount of $50,000.00 each*
10. Tbe acts of Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEE3HAUER, were malicious and said
Defendant i s guilty of wanton disregard far the rights of and ccmsequences
to the Plaintiffs and by reason thereof. Plaintiffs demand exemplary and
punitive damages against the said Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEEIHAZZR, in the arouht
Of PZFK TBODSMID ($50,000.00) DOUAFS « * * .
11. B a t the Plaintiffs have oeen required to obtain the services of
an attorney to prosecute this action and that i t would be inequitable not
to grant the Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fees and that the Osurt should
enter an order granting'to the Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fees for the
prosecution of this action and also as provided by .Section 73-27-56«.

12. That the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIER, in causing the exhibit A
and B to be prepared with the figure of $371,750.00, instead of the figure
$25,000.00 and is ncnnTtinn of the same without informing plaintiffs otherwise, made a representation that $25,000.00 was on exhibit A and B instead
of $371,750.00 concerning presently existing material facts; which were
false hpcytnse the true figure which should have been $25,000.00 instead of
$371,750.00; which he either knew to be false, or his made recklessly, knowing
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation;
for the' purpose of inducing the CEEEVEES to act upon his representation
that exhibit A and B was only for $25,000.00 and not for $371,750.00; that
the CBEE\EPS, acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the said
representation that exhibit A and B were for $25,000.00 and not for $371,750.00
that the\CEEEVEFS did in fact rely upon said false representations that its
contents reflected $25,000.00 and they had a right to rely upon the fact
that the document prepared by the defendants, would literally conform to the
agreement of $25,000.00 if no notice of the contrary was given.

VKEEEFQIE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows
on the FUST CAUSE OF ACTION.
1.

That the Court decree that Exhibit "A" be reformed to declare that

\E2MCN S. CHESTER i s individually liable only to the extent of $25,000.00
for any obligation owing to the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR and MXRA K.
SEETHAIZR*
2.

That the Court decree that Exhibit "B" be reformed, to show that the

Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR and MZRA K. SEE1HAIZR, have a SECOND DEED
OF TTOST limited to the extent of $25,000,00 and no more and subject to a
FUST TTOST DEED in favor of an entity of plaintiffs choice at anytime in the
amount of $44,000.00 and/or that Plaintiffs are entitled to the f i r s t $44,000.00
equity in the property.
3.

jn the alternative that the Court decree that Exhibits "A" and "B" be

rescinded and that a l l parties be returned to their respective positions prior
to wmrntim of Exhibits "A" and "B".
4.

That the Plaintiffs recover $50,000.00 general damages each against

the Defendants and each of them.
5.

TSvat the Plaintiff be awarded exemplary and punitive damages in the

amount of $50,000.00 each against the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR.
6.

That the Plaintiff be awarded a reasonable attorney's fees for the

li'iivjieetjutinn of this action.
7.

For such other and further r e l i e f that i s just and equitable.

SECOND CADSB OF ACTION
As paragraphs 1 to 11 of this SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, Plaintiffs reallege
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the FUST CAUSE OF ACTION.
12.

Inat prior to the 10th day of June, 1981, the Defendant, JOSEPH A.

SEETHAIZR, acting for himself and as agent for his wife, MXRA K. SEETBAIER,
entered into negotiations for the sale of their meat packing plant to OTBH
C0ONTT PACKING, INC., a Utah Corporation.

(h) Said Defendant represented that the electrical system in the plant
was in good operating condition; that in truth in fact; before a
business license was issued to the Plaintiffs at or about $8,000.00
was spent as condition to get a business license for electrical
repairs.
(i) Said Defendant represented that telephone system was in good
operating condition; that in truth in fact, a whole new phone
system had to be installed; that prior to the replacement, it was
always being repaired.
(j) Said Defendant represented that all of the three smoke houses in
the plant were in good operating condition except for one clogged
drain; in truth in fact, only one worked and coils had to be replaced to get the second to work but the toiler was not sufficient
capacity to run three at once.
00

The said Defendant represented that two of the three electric
hoists in the plant were in good working .and operating condition
and that the third hoist had all new parts and that siicply was in
need of assembly; that in truth in fact, they did not work and
had to be inmediately repaired.

(1) The said Defendant represented that the reason for the red tags on
the equipment in the package room was merely that the set of
equipment was in need of "a little cleaning"; that in truth in fact,
moisture was dripping off the ceiling and drip pans and suction fans
had to be installed at great expense in order to remove the red tag
placed by the meat inspectors.
(m) Thfl said Defendant represented that, the elevatqr in the building
was in good operable condition and had a value of $25,000.00; that
in truth in fact, was in very poor condition and continually break*
ing down on numerous occassions and of little value.,
(n) The said Defendant represented that the roof on the building was
in good condition and was "fine, no problemN; that in truth in fact,
it leaked in several place* and SEETHALZR had been warned' by the
inspectors that water was dripping down the walls of the coolers and
otherplaces and did in fact so drip*
(o) The said Defendant
cluded in the sale
condition; tiiat in
one of the two did

represented that four Dodge trucks which were inwere refrigerated and in good working and operable
truth in fact, only two were refrigerated and
not work.

(p) The said Defendant represented that all six of the S C T I P S in the
operation were in good condition; that in truth in fact, none of
them would pass inspection by the DEPAKTMNT OF WEICSTS AND I€ASUEES
without repair at great expense^ that repair was made at great expense.

(q) the said Defendant represented that the Patty machines were in good
operating condition except that "one of the machines needed a
little repair*; that in truth in fact, neither worked, and a new
one had to be purchased at an expense of $36,000.00.
(r) The said Defendant represented that the "meat chopper" was working
and in good working order and in good operable condition; that in
truth in fact, it needed new bearings, belts, and controls at
great expense.
(s) The said Defendant/that the "Mince Master* was in good operable
and working aondltion; that in truth in fact, it required numerous
repairs and great time waiting for hard to find parts.
(t) The said Defendant represented, that the "Bam Blender* was in good
working and operating condition; that in truth in fact, paddle
bearings were worn out and the machine was leaking rusty water and
grease.
(u) The said Defendant represented that the lunch meat slicer was in
good operable and working condition and specifically represented
that the said machine was working and that it could be set for any
adjustment needed for the amount of slices required; that in truth
in fact, immediate repairs of at or about $500.00 was required to
have a new electrical control system and other repairs.
(v) The said Defendant represented that the "weiner peeler* was in good
operable and working condition; that in truth in fact, a new motor
and vaccuun and pulleys and controls had to be replaced at great
expense*
(w) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging machine1' was in
good operable and working condition and that in order to produce
packages that would hang up on the walls for display that merely a
die would need to be purchased.
(x) The saJdiEefendant represented that the "boiler" was in good operating and working condition and further represented, "that's a good
old boiler; better than the new one"; that in truth in fact, a
year prior to sale, the controls did not work and six months before
it almost blew up. In order to keep it working, it had to be
*»-Hn«ri
and new lines replaced. It was not of sufficient capacity to run the three "smoke houses" at once.
(y) Said Defendant represented that he owned the "tipper ^.es" and
that the "tipper ties" were included in the sale and further that
the 002 tank was owned by the said Defendant and included in the
sale; that in truth in fact. Defendant did not own them.
(z) Said Defendant represented that the "refrigeration system" was in
good operable and working condition; that in truth in fact, the
condensers were worn out; solenoid valves, coils, and pipes were

old and rusted and continually leaked annania. Many other replacements were made*
(aa) Said Defendant represented that the "ice inker" was in good operable
and working condition; that in truth in fact, it was junked after
six months and after great expense and repair.
(bb) She said Defendant represented that the "band saw" was in good
operating and working condition; that in truth in fact, the
bottom shaft and bearings were worn out and finally completely had to be
overhauled.
(cc) The said Defendant represented taht the "staple machines" were in
good working and operating condition; that in truth in fact, they
were worn out and had to be replaced within a few weeks.
(dd) The said Defendant represented that the "hand slicer" was in good
working and operating condition; that in truth and fact, it was
worn out and bearing, blade, and motor had to be replaced.
(ee) The said Defendant represented that the bade metal steps, big oak
desk, garage jack, an office typewriter,
lable addresser, a filing
cabinet, a vise, several length of pipe, and sereral stainless
steel buckets were all included in the sale agreement; that in
truth in fact, defendant took them from the plant just prior to the
sale*
(ff) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging machine" was in
good operable and working condition and that in order to produce
packages that would hang up en the walls for display that merely a
die would need to be purchased; that in truth in fact, it needed
more than a new die; the machine was obsolete; the factory representative stated, "new parts could not be obtained"; 002 leaked
from tiie packages; the machine had to be replaced about 90 days
from the purchase at an expense of at or about $61,000.00.
That by reason of the aforesaid conduct, and the unmerchantable nature
of the equipment, and breach of warranties of Defendants express and inplied
UXSB GQQfIX PARING G C M N W INC,, a Utah Corporation, was imaKle to
effectively carry en the business' sold by the Defendants and was unable to
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realize a profit, all to Plaintiffs• injury.
15. That the Plaintiffs, relying upon the fraudulent representations,
warranties, and agreements of the Defendant, consented to guarantee the
payment of $25,000.00 of the purchase price and no more.
16* That the Plaintiffs would not have entered into guarantee $25,000.00
of the purchase price but for the fruadulent representations of the Defendant,
JOSEPH A. SEEXHAIZR, and if the Plaintiffs would have been informed of the true
facts they never would have entered into any guarantee of any payment individually
and would not have signed Exhibit A or B. Plaintiff, VEItOl S. CHEEVER, as
President of Utah Cbutny Packing-Co. Inc., wouldn't have purchased said business
but for saidrepresentationa which he relied upon which were false.
17. That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the defendant,
JOSEPH AJ* SEETHAIZR, the Plaintiffs have suffered great distress of body and
mind and have been greatly injured and damaged in their credit standing and
reputation and by reason thereof have been damaged in the sum of $50,000.00
generalrtanwgr»weach.
18. The fraudulent acts of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIZR, were malicious and he was guilty of wanton disregard of the rights and consequences
of the Plaintiffs and by reason thereof Plaintiffs demand exemplary and punitive damages against said Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEEIHAIER, in the sum of
%50,000.00 each.
19. That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendants, JOSEPH A.
SEEIHAIER and VKBA. K. SEE3HALER, the Court or jury should decree that it is
not equitable that the Plaintiffs be bound personally liable for the debt of
Utah County Packing, Inc., and enter an order releasing them from their personal liability and their collateral described on Exhibit B and decree that

Exhibit A 6 B aze void and of no effect.
VHEREPOFJB, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows
on the SEOCND CAUSE OF ACTION.
1. That the Court determine the amount of damages to be assessed against
tha Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIER and MKRA K. SEETHAIER, by reason of their
fraudulent conduct as it applied to Utah ODunty Packing Company Inc., and use
the sane as set-off against any obligation that may. be determined to be owed
by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIER and MORA K. SEETHAIER
and to finally sake a determination as to the obligations of the Plaintiffs
and the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHAIER and MXRA K. SEETHAIER.
2. That the Plaintiffs recover $50,000.00 general damages each against
the Defendants and each of them inaddition to the foregoing paragraph.
3. VOvat the Plaintiffs recover exemplary and punitive damages against the
Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEEIHALER, in the sum of $50,000.00..
4. That the Court enter an order releasing plaintiffs from their
collateral described on Exhibit B and decree that Exhibit A i B are void
and of no effect.
5. That the Court award a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prosecution of this action.
6. For such other and further relief as to the Court is just and proper.
THIRD CA05E OF ACTIO?
As paragraphs 1 to 19 of the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION, Plaintiff realleges
paragraphs 1 to Id of the SECOND GAOSE OF ACTION.
20. That tiie negotiations between the Plaintiff and Defendant *ers not
supported by consideration and not sufficient to constitute a contract between
the parties in that there was no meeting of the minds and no agreement was
reached and the Court should decree that Exhibit A & B are void and of no

effect.
WEHEFQI&, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendants as follows
on the THUS) OUJSE OP ACITCN.
J.Biat the Plaintiffs reoover $50,000.00 general damages each against
the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEE3HAIER.
2. That the Plaintiffs recover exenplary and punitive damages against
the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEE2BKLER, in the sum of $50,000.00 each.
3. That the Osurt enter an order releasing Plaintiffs from their personal
liability and their collateral described on Exhibit B and decree that Exhibit
A 6 B are void and of no effect.
4. That the Osurt award a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prosecution of this action.
5. for such other and further relief as to the Court is just and proper*
FODREH CN3SE OF ACTIO!
As to paragraphs 1-19 of the FOCKm GMD5E QF ACTIO!, plaintiff realleges
paragraphs 1 to 19 of the SEOCND CAUSE OF ACTICN.
2 0 . That the Defendants had notice of the true facts of the condition of
the equipment and drcunstances heretofore alleged*
21. That it would be inequitable for the Defendants to now claim any
right or interest under Exhibits A or B and are therefore estopped frcm
claiming any right or interest under Exhibits A or B and both should be declared
void*
22. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at la*.
WESEFOFE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgnent against the Defendants as follows
on the PODHIH CADSE CF ACTTCNe.
1* That the Cburt determine that it would be inequitable for the
Defendants to claim any* right or interest under Exhibit A or B and that they
are estopped from claiming any right or interest to Exhibit A or B.
2. That the Plaintiffs reoover $50,000.00 general damages each against

the Defendants and each of them.
3. That the Plaintiffs recover exemplary and punitive damages against
the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER>' in the sum of $250,000.00 each.
4. That the ODurt enter an order releasing Plaintiffs from their
collateral described on Exhibit B and decree that Exhibit A 6 B are void and
of no effect.
5. That the ODurt award a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prosecution of this action.
6. For such other and further relief as to the Oourt is just and proper.
FlfcTH CAUSE OP ACTION
As to paragraphs 1 to 19 of this FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION, Plaintiffs reallege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 19 of the SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION.
20. That on or about the 30th day of March, 2983, the Defendant, SECURITY
TTTTZ AND ABSTRACT COJKWT, filed a NOTICE OF DEEAEILE/ a copy of idiich is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C and made a part hereof as is set forth herein
at length*
21. That no sale of the said, property has yet been conducted pursuant to
the said NOTICE OF DEFAULT.
22. That the Defendants, are threatening to, pursuant to section
57-1-25 of the Utah Code, to sell the said property at trustees sale; no
NOTICE OF THDSTEB SAIZ has yet'been filed nor has .any publication yet been
made pursuant to tee statute.
23. That an unfair advantage has been gained by the Defendants,
SEETHALEBS, through their fraud, and/or the mutual mistake of the parties,
and that it is against good conscience to let the mistake stand and it
would be inequitable to allow the foreclosure of the property set forth in
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Exhibit "B" and the Cburt should issue an oxder enjoining the Defendants
from continuing with the foreclosure including injunction, restraining order,
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or such other means as
would be just and equitable.
24. That Section 57-1-23 of the Utah Code, which gives to a beneficiary
an option to foreclose trust deeds as provided for foreclosure of mortgages of
Baal Property, without providing the sans right to the Plaintiff, is a violation of the due process and equal pLDtPt.il.-inn clauses aa provided by the 14th
amendment of the 0.3. Oansititutionj the Court should decree that the Plaintiff
has the sane right and the Oourt ahould decree that judicial foreclosure be
made of the proeprty in lieu of the statutory foreclosure undertaken by DezancLBncse
25; That it is inequitable that Defendants should be allowed by nonjudicial sale to foreclose the property; that the Cburt should decree that
the property be foreclosed "in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure
of mortgages on Real Property •
26. Plaintiff has no adequate randy at latt or otherwise to prevent
the harm or damage threatened by the defendants by reason of their threat
to sell the said property, without the Oanrt hearing the case on its merits
and this Oaurt should restrain and prevent the foreclosure sale on said
property until this action is resolved on the merits.
27. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable haxm, damage, and injury, unless
the acts and conduct of the Defendant above onnplained of or enjoined, because
the property would be sold without the Plaintiffs being able to assert their
defenses as herein set forth in this ocsplaint.
28. The hereinmentioned property is the homestead of the Plaintiffs and
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qualifies as exempt property under the Utah Homestead Act within the statute
provisions of the act.
MBEREHORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the Defendants as allows:
1. That a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issue restraining Defendants, their
servants and employees from proceeding vdth any TRUSTEE SAIE, until a hearing
is had on Plaintiffs application for a preliminary injunction and restraining
the Defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, during the pending of
thijs arrHon from continuing the foreclosure of the property on Exhibit B of
the Complaint or ptoonerting further under Exhibit C of the Complaint by sale
or otherwise*
2. That a preliminary injunction issue enjoining the Defendants, their
•exvauLa and employees from proceeding with any TRUSTEE SAI2, or publishing
notice of same, during the pendency of this action and restraining the
Defendants, their agents, servants, and employees, during the pendency of
this action from continuing the foreclosure of the property on Exhibit B
of the Complaint or proceeding further under Exhibit C of the Cjomplaint by sale
or otherwise.
3. That on a final hearing, defendants, and their agents, servants
and employees, be permanently enjoined from proceeding with any TRUSTEE SAIE,
or publication of notice thereof and restraining the ?Defendants their agents,
servants, and employees, during the pendency of this action from continuing
the foreclosure of the property on Exhibit B of the Complaint or proceeding
further under Exhibit C of the Onplaint by sale or otherwise.
4. That the Court issue an order that a Judicial Jbreclosure "in the
w a w w r provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on Real Property4*
be made of the property in lieu of the sunmary and non-judicial foreclosure

14

undertaken by the Defendants.
5. That the Plaintiff receive aosts and expenses incurred herein.
6. That the Plaintiff receives such other additional relief as nay
seem just and equitable to the Court.
SIXTH CAP5B CF ACTIO?
As paragraphs 1-28 of this SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION, Plaintiffs reallege
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-28 of the FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTIO}.
29. That by reason of the allegations set forth herein, the affidavits
on file herein, the deposition of JOSEPH A. SEETHALEF, filed herein, a
dispute and actual controversy now exists between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants as to the Plaintiffs rights, duties and obligations as to Exhibits
A and B; until such dispute is settled, Defendant should not be allowed to
proceed>with foreclosure and the Plaintiffs cannot property determine their
rights and obligations under Exhibits A and B.
30. Plaintiffs have made an application with DESESET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCZATiaN of Salt Lake City, Utah to obtain a $44,000.00 loan to be
secured by a First Trust Dead to DESESET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION.
31. The Bpwriflc mnttur in dispute is set forth herein and in the file
herein.
32. This SIXTH CA05E OF\ACnCN is brought under IDLE 57 of the Utah Pules
of Civil Procedure.
WEHEF0RE, Plaintiff prays as follows:
1. For a judgment declaring the rights, duties and legal relations of
the Plaintiff and Defendants with regards to Exhibit A and B so that the
Plaintiff can determine their rights and duties thereunder, and if they can
grant a FIRST TTOST DEED in the amount of $44,000.00 to l.ftihKHb*r FEDERAL
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SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION.
2.

That the Court decree that Exhibit "B" be reformed, to

show that the Defendants, JOSEPH A, SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER,
have a SECOND DEED OF TRUST limited to the extent of $25,000.00 and
no more and subject to a FIRST TRUST DEED in favor of an entity of
Plaintiffs choice at anytime in the amount of $44,000.00.
3.

That the Plaintiffs recover $50,000.00 general damages each

against the Defendants, the SEETHALERS, and each of them.
4*

That the plaintiff be awarded exemplary and punitive

damages in the amount of $50,000.00 each against the Defendant,
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER.
5.

That the Plaintiff be awarded a reasonable attorney's fees

for the prosecution of this action.
6.

For such other and,further relief that is just and equitable*

COME NOW the Plaintiff, UTAH COUNTY PACKING INC., a Utah Corporation, and for cause of action against the Defendants, complain
and allege as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

That on or about the 10th day of June, 1981, VERNON S.

CHEEVER, as President of the Plaintiff, Utfch County Packing Inc.,
executed a TRUST DEED NOTE wherein the Defendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER, were payees? a copy of which is
attached hereto and made a part hereof as if set forth herein at
length and marked as Exhibit "A".
2.

That prior to the 10th day of June, 1981, the Defendant,

JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, acting for himself and as agent for his wife,
MYRA. K. SEETHALER, entered into negotiations for the sale of their
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. . t pacfcin, * *

.to the Plainti«. « « • « «

SACKIKG. INC.. .

Utah Corporation*
3.

That in the course of the negotiations, the Defendant,

JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, made representations; concerning presently
existing material facts; which were false; which he either knew
to be false, or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representations; for the purpose
of inducing UTAH COUNTY PACXING INC. to act upon his representations; that the UTAH COUNTY PACKING INC., acted reasonably and in
ignorance of the falsity of the said representations; that did in
fact rely upon said false representations; that by reason thereby,
it was induced to be liable on the sale; that by reason of agreeing to be liable on the sale it has been greatly injured and
damaged.

The representations refer-

to include, but are not

limited to:
(a) The Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, represented that
the plant and all equipment therein was "in top working
condition"; that in truth and fact, it was not for the
reasons hereafter cited.
(b) Said Defendant represented that "everything was new
or better than new because of the maintenance program";
that in truth in fact, he had no maintenance program other
than to keep it running; there was no regular lubrication
program; lubrication was not performed daily.
(c) The said Defendant represented that in order to operate
the beef cooler that all was needed was to turn on a valve
and that the coolers werw all in good operating condition,
and that the reason that the said coolers were not cold
at the time of that conversation was because the said
Defendant had turned them down, that he did not need them
cold; that in truth in fact, the system was so worn out
that the coil was ruptured and would not work and had to
be replaced.
(d) Said Defendant represented that the electrical system
in the plant was in good operating condition; that in truth
in fact; before a business license was issued to the Plaintiffs at or about $8,000.00 was spent as condition to get a
business license for electrical repairs.
(e) Said Defendant represented that telephone system was
in good operating condition; that in truth in fact, a whole
new phone system had to be installed; that prior to the replacement, it was always being repaired.

(f) ^aid Defendant represented that all of the three smoke
houses In" the plant were in good operating condition except
for one clogged drain; in truth in fact, only one worked and
coils had to be replaced to get the second to work but the
boiler was not sufficient capacity to run three at once.
(g) The said Defendant represented that two of the three
electric hoists in the plant were in good working and operating condition and that the third hoist had all new parts
and that simply was in need of assembly; that in truth in
fact, they did not work and had to be immediately repaired.
(h) The said Defendant represented that the reason for
the red tags on the equipment in the package room was merely
that the set of equipment was in need of "a little cleaning";
that in truth in fact, moisture was dripping off the ceiling
and drip pans and suction fans had to be installed at great
expense in order to remove the red tag placed by the meat
inspectors.
(i) The said Defendant represented that the elevator in the
building was in good operable condition and had a value of
$25,000^00; that in truth in fact, was in very poor condition
^nd continually breaking down on numerous occassions and of
little value.
(j) The said Defendant represented that the roof on the
building was in good condition and was "fine, no problem";
that in truth in fact, it leaked in several places and
SEETHALER had been warned by the inspectors that water was
dripping down the walls of the coolers and other places and
did in fact so drip.
(k) The said Defendant represented that four Dodge trucks
which were included in the sale were refrigerated and in good
working and operable condition; that in truth in fact, only
two were refrigerated and one of the two did not work.
(1) The said Defendant represented that all six of the scales
in the operation were in good condition; that in truth in
fact, none of them would pass inspection by the DEPARTMENT OF
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES without repair at great expense; that
repair was made at great expense.
(m) The said Defendant represented that the Patty machines
were in good operating condition except that "one of the
machines needed a little repair"; that in truth in fact,
neither worked, and a new one had to be purchased at an
expense of $36,000.00.
(n)

The said Defendant represented that the "meat chopper*
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was working and in good working order and in good operable
condition; that in truth in fact, it needed new bearings, belts
and controls at great expense.
(o) The said Defendant represented that the "mince master"
was in good operable and working condition? that in truth in
fact, it required numerous repairs and great time waiting
for hard to find parts.
(p) The said Defendant represented that the "ham blender"
was in good working and operating condition; that in truth
in fact, paddle bearings were worn dut and the machine was
leaking rusty water and grease.
(q) The said Defendant represented that the lunch meat slicer
was in good operable and working condition and specifically
represented that the said machine was working and that it
could be set for any adjustment needed for tne amount of
slices required; that in truth in fact, immediate repairs of
at or about $500.00 was required to have a new electrical
control system and other repairg.
(r) The said Defendant represented that the "weiner peeler"
was in good operable and working condition; that in truth in
fact, a new motor and vaccuum and pulleys and controls had
to be replaced at great expense.
(s) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging
machine" was in operable and working condition and Chat--.in
order to produce packages that would hang'>up on the walls for
display that merely a die would need to be purchased.
(t) The said Defendant represented that the "boiler" was in
good operating and working condition and further represented,
"that's a good old boiler; better than* the new one"; that
in truth in fact, a year prior to sale, the controls did not
work and six months before, it almost blew up. In order to
keep it working, it had to be delimed and new lines replaced.
It was not of sufficient capacity to run the three "smoke
houses" at once.
(u) Said Defendant represented that he o*med the "tipper
ties" and that the "tipper ties" were include^ in the sale
and further that the C02 tank was owned by the sair» nefendant
and included in the sale; that in truth in fact, Defendant
not own them.
(v) Said Defendant, represented that the "refrigeration
system" was in good operable and working condition; that in
truth in fact, the condensors were worn out; solenoid valves,
coils, and pipes were old and rusted and continually leaked
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amonia.

Many other replacements were made.

(w) Said Defendant represented that the "ice maker" was in
good operable and working condition; that in truth in fact,
it was junked after six months and after great expense and
repair.
(x) The said Defendant represented that the "band saw" was
in good operating and working condition; that in truth in
fact, the bottom shaft and bearings were worn out and finally
completely had to be overhauled.
(y) The said Defendant represented that the "staple
machines" were in good working and operating condition; that
in truth in fact, they were worn out and had to be replaced
within a few weeks.
(2) The said Defendant represented that the "hand slicer"
was in good working and operating condition; that in truth
and fact, it was worn out and bearing, blade, and motor had
to be replaced.
(aa) The said Defendant represented that the back metal steps,
big oak desk, garage jack, an office typewriter, lable
addresser, a filing cabinet, a vise, several length of pipe,
and several stainless steel buckets were all included in the
sale agreement; that in truth in fact, defendant took them from
the plant just prior to the sale.
(bb) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging
maching" was in good operable and working condition and that
in order to produce packages that would hang up on the walls
for display that merely a die would need to be purchased;
that in truth in fact, it needed more than a new die; the
machine was obsolete; the factory representative stated, "new
parts could not be obtained"; C02 leaked from the packages;
the machine had to be replaced about 90 days from the purchase
at an expense of at or about $61,000.00.
4-

That by reason of the aforesaid conduct, and the unmer-

chantable nature of the equipment, and breach of warranties of
Defendants express and implied UTAH COUNTY PACKING COMPANY INC.,
a Utah Corporation, was unable to effectively carry on the business sold by the Defendants and was unable to realize a profit,
all to Plaintiffs1 injury. •
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5. That the Plaintiffs, relying upon the fraudulent representations, warranties, and agreements of the Defendant, consented
to agree to payment of Exhibit "AH.
6*

That the Plaintiffs would not have entered into Exhibit

"A" but for the fraudulent representations of the Defendant,
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, and if the Plaintiffs would have been informed
of the true facts, it never would have entered into Exhibit "A,f.
VERNON S. CHEEVER, as President of Utah County Packing Co. Inc.,
wouldn't have purchased said business but for said presentations
which he relied upon which were false.
7.

That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendant,

JOSEPH A. SEETHLAER, the Plaintiffs have suffered great damage
in the sum of $150,000.00 general damages.
8.

The fraudulent acts of the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEET-

HALER, were malicious and he was guilty of wanton disregard of the
rights and consequences of the Plaintiffs and by reason thereof
Plaintiffs demand exemplary and punitive damages against said
Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, in the sum of
9.

$50,000.00.

That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the De-

fendants, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER, the Court or
jury should decree that it is not equitable that the Plaintiffs
be bound liable on Exhibit "A" and enter an order releasing it
from their liability on Exhibit "A" and decree that Exhibit "A"
is of no effect.
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10.

That the Plaintiffs have been required to obtain the

services of an attorney to prosecute this action and that it would
be inequitable not to grant the Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's
fees and that the Court should enter an order granting to the
Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of
this action and also as provided by Section 78-27-56.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants
as follows on the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
1.

That the Plaintiffs recover $150,000.00 general damages

against the Defendants and each of tnem.

2.

That the Plaintiff recover exemplary and punitive damages

against the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER,. in the sum of $50,000.00.
3.

That the Court enter an order releasing Plaintiffs from

liability on Exhibit "A" and decree that Exhibit "A" is void and
of no effect.
4.

That the Court award a reasonable attorney's fee in

favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prosecution of this action.
5.

For such other and further relief as to the Court is

just and proper.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

That on or about the 18th day of June, 1981, the Plaintiff

paid to the Defendant, JOSEPH SEETHALER, the sum of $10,822.70 as
evidenced by a check, a copy of which is attached hereto as exhibit
"F".
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2.

That the check was given by mistake, coersion, to the

said defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, and without a valuable consideration and constituted an UNJUST ENRICHMENT for the reason
that the said was paid to him for payment of accounts receivables
which were sold with the business and for which the Defendant is
now indebted to this Plaintiff for the sum of $10,822.70, together
with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from June 18,
1981.
3.

That the Plaintiff has been required to obtain the

services of an attorney to prosecute this action and it would be
inequitable not to grant the Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees
and that the Court should enter an order granting to the Plaintiff
a reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this action
*wd «l»e «» pnavivtoU by Section 7S-2?-5$ of the UCA.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant
on the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION in the amount of $10,822.70, together
with interest thereon at the rate of 10% from the 18th day of June,
1981, together with attorney's fees, costs of Court and such other
and further relief as is just and equitable.
COME NOW THE Plaintiff, COLES BROTHERS, INC., a Utah Corporation, and for cause of action against the Defendants, complain
and allege as follows:

1.

That on or about the 10th day

of June, 1981, BRUCE H.

COLES, as Secretary/Treasurer of the Plaintiff, Utah County Packing,
Inc., executed a TRUST DEED NOTE wherein the Defendants, JOSEPH A.
SEETHALER and MYRA K. SEETHALER, were payees; a copy of which is
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attached hereto and made a part hereof as if set forth herein at
length and marked as Exhibit "A".
2.

That prior to the 10th day of June, 1981, the Defendant,

JOSEPH A* SEETHALER, acting for himself and as agent for his wife,
MYRA K. SEETHALER, entered into negotiations for the sale of their
meat packing plant to UTAH COUNTY PACKING, INC., a Utah Corporation.
3#

That in the course of thenegotiations, the Defendant, JOSEPH

A. SEETHALER, made representations; concerning presently existing
material facts; which were false; which he either knew to be false,
or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representations; for the purpose of inducing
COLES BROTHERS, INC., to act upon his representations; that COLES
BROTHERS, INC., acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity
of the said representations; that did in fact rely upon said false
representations; that by reason thereby, it was induced to be liable
on the sale; that by reason of agreeing to be liable on the sale
it has been greatly injured and damaged.

The representations re-

ferred to include, but are not limited to:
(a) The Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, represented that
the plant and all equipment therein was "in top working
condition9; that in truth and fact, it waa not for the
reasons hereafter cited.
(b) Said Defendant represented that "everything was new
or better than new because of the maintenance proq^am";
that in truth in fact, he had no maintenance program other
than to keep it running; there was no regular lubrication
program; lubrication waa not performed daily.
(c) The said Defendant represented that in order to operate
the beef cooler that all waa needed was to turn on a valve
and that the coolers werw all in good operating condition9
and that the reason that the said coolers were not cold
at the time of that conversation was because the said
Defendant had turned them down, that he did not need then
cold; that in truth in fact, the system was so worn out
that the coil was ruptured and would not work and had to
te*e r«T»l3jced-

,-, —
WL.na.ne r.pr...nted that «*• i E ^ f i ? ' U S .
in the plant was in good operating conditio^
^ S h . Plainin fact; before a business license was l s a u ^ . ^ ° ^ ?
t
tiffs at or about $8,000.00 was spent as condition to get a
business license for electrical repairs.
(e) Said Defendant represented that telephone system was
in good operating condition; that in truth in fact, a whole
new phone system had to be installed? that prior to the replacement, it was always being repaired.
(f) Said Defendant represented that all of the three unto
houses in the plant were in good operating ^ n d l t l o n ^ e ^
for one clogged drain; in truth in fact, only one worked and
coils had to be replaced to get the second to work but the
boiler was not sufficient capacity to run three at once.
(g) The said Defendant represented that two of the three
electric hoists in the plant were in good working and operating condition and that the third hoist had all new parts
and that simply was in need of assembly; that in truth in
fact, they did not work and had to be immediately repaired.
(h) The said Defendant represented that the reason for
the red tags on the equipment in the package room was merely
that the set of equipment was in need of "a little cleaning*;
that in truth in fact, moisture was dripping off the ceiling
and drip pans and suction fans had to be installed at great
expense in order to remove the red tag placed by the meat
inspectors.
(i) The said Defendant represented that the elevator in the
building was in good operable condition and had a value of.
$25,000*00; that in truth in fact, was in very poor conditioi
and continually breaking down on numerous occassions and of
little value.
(j) The said Defendant represented that the roof on the
building was in good condition and was "fine, no problem19;
that in truth in fact, it leaked in several places and
SEETHALER had been warned by the inspectors that water was
dripping down the walls of the coolers and other places and
did in fact so drip.
Ik) The said Defendant represented that four Dodge trucks
which were included in the sale were refrigerated and in good
working and operable condition; that in truth in fact, only
two were refrigerated and one of the two did not work.
(1) The said Defendant represented that all six oi the scales
in the operation were in good condition; that in truth in
fact, none of them would pass inspection by the DEPARTMENT OP
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES without repair at great expense; that
repair was made at great expense*
(m) The said Defendant represented that the Patty machines
were in good operating condition except that -one of the
machines needed a little repair"; that in truth in fact,
neither worked, and a new one had to be purchased at an
expense of $36,000.00•
(n) The said Defendant represented that the •meat chopoer*

was working and in good working order and in good operable
condition; that in truth in fact, it needed new bearings, belts
and controls at great expense.
(o) The said Defendant represented that the "mince master*1
was in good operable and working condition; that in truth in
fact, it required numerous repairs and great time waiting
for hard to find parts.
(p) The said Defendant represented that the "ham blender"
was in good working and operating condition; that in truth
in fact, paddle bearings were worn but and the machine was
leaking rusty water and grease.
(q) The said Defendant represented that the lunch meat slicer
was in good operable and working condition and specifically
represented that the said machine was working and that it
could be set for any adjustment needed for the amount of
slices required; that in truth in fact, immediate repairs of
at or about $500.00 was required to have a new electrical
control system and other repair?.
(r) The said Defendant represented that the "weiner peeler"
was in good operable and working condition; that in truth in
fact, a new motor and vaccuum and pulleys and controls had
to be replaced at great expense*
(s) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging
machine" was in operable and working condition and Chat..in
order to produce packages that would hang >up on the walls for
display that merely a die would need to be purchased.
(t) The said Defendant represented that the "boiler" was in
good operating and working condition and further represented,
"that's a good old boiler; better thain • the new one"; that
in truth in fact, a year prior to sale, the controls did not
work and six months before, it almost blew up. In order to
keep it working, it had to be delimed and new lines replaced.
It was not of sufficient capacity to man the three "smoke
houses" at once.
(u) Said Defendant represented that he o»me<?. the "tipper
ties" and that the "tipper ties" were include** in the sale
and further that the C02 tank was owned by the sai^1 nefendant
and included in the sale; that in truth in f?.ct. Defendant
not own them.
(v) Said Defendant represented that the "refrigeration
system" was in good operable and working condition; that in
truth in fact, the condensors were worn out? solenoid valves,
coils, and pipes were old and rusted and continually leaked
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amonia.

Many other replacements were made.

(w) Said Defendant represented that the "ice maker" was in
good operable and working condition; that in truth in fact,
it was junked after six months and after great expense and
repair.
(x) The said Defendant represented that the "band saw" was
in good operating and working condition; that in truth in
fact, the bottom shaft and bearings were worn out and finally
completely had to be overhauled*
(y) The said Defendant represented that the "staple
machines" were in good working and operating condition; that
in truth in fact, they were worn out and had to be replaced
within a few weeks.
(z) The said Defendant represented that the "hand slicer"
was in good working and operating condition; that in truth
and fact, it was worn out and bearing, blade, and motor had
to be replaced.
(aa) The said Defendant represented that the back metal steps,
big oak desk, garage jack, an office typewriter, lable
addresser, a filing cabinet, a vise, several length of pipe,
and several stainless steel buckets were all included in the
sale agreement; that in truth in fact, defendant took them from
the plant just prior to the sale.
(bb) The said Defendant represented that the "packaging
maching" was in good operable and working condition and that
in order to produce packages that would hang up on the walls
for display that merely a die would need to be purchased;
that in truth in fact, it needed more than a new die; the
machine was obsolete; the factory representative stated, "new
parts could not be obtained"; C02 leaked from the packages;
the machine had to be replaced about 90 days from the purchase
at an expense of at or about $61,000.00.
4j

That by reason of the aforesaid conduct, and the unmer-

chantable nature of the equipment, and breach of warranties of
Defendants express and implied UTAH COUNTY PACKING COMPANY INC.,
a Utah Corporation, was unable to effectively carry on the business sold by the Defendants and was unable to realize a profit,
•11 to Plaintiffs1 injury.
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5.

That the Plaintiffs, relying upon the fraudulent representa-

tions , warranties, and agreements of the Defendant, consented
to agree to payment of Exhibit "A".
6.

That the Plaintiffs would not have entered into Exhibit "A" .

but for the fraudulent representations of the Defendant, JOSPEH
A. SEETHALER, and if the Plaintiffs would have been informed of
the true facts, it never would have entered into Exhibit "A".
7*

That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendant,

JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, the Plaintiffs have suffered great damage in
the sum of $150f000.00 general damages.
8.

The fraudulent acts of theDefendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER,

were malicious and he was guilty of wanton disregard of the
rights and consequences of the Plaintiffs and by reason thereof
Plaintiffs demand exemplary and punitive damages against said
Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHLAER, in the sum of $50,000.00.
9.

That by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the Defendants,

JOSEPH A. SEETHALER AND MYRA K. SEETHALER, the Court or jury
should decree that it is not equitable that the Plaintiffs be
bound liable on Exhibit "A" and enter an order releasing it from
their liability on Exhibit "A" and decree that Exhibit "A" is of
no effect.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants
as follows.
1.

That the Plaintiffs recover $150,000.00 general damages

against the Defendants and'each of them.
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2.

That the Plaintiff recover exemplary and punitive damages

against the Defendant, JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, in the sum of
$50,000.00.
3.

That the Court enter an order releasing Plaintiffs from

liability on Exhibit "A" and decree that Exhibit "A" is void and
of no effect.
4.

That the Court award a reasonable attorney's fee in

favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants for the prosecution of this action.
5. For such other and further relief as to the Court is
just and proper.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was hand delivered to the Law office of JACKSON
HOWARD, 120 E. 3Q0 No., Provo, Utah on the /<? "S^day of
July, 1984, and also to the law office of ROBERT MOODY, 55
East Center, Provo, Utah on the same date.
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NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE
The following describe*! property will lie r.old at public auction to the highest bidder on the 3 l ! l _
day of J^EEii
, ML-55- at .il?-Qi l . A.M. at the front door of tine ...JUlnlt
County Court
House at }£?*»
, Utah lit the County of _ - R « k
-...
. INSECURITY TITLE & ABSTRACT
CO. . as Trustee under the Peed of Trust wade by .Ventou s i ^^^y^^?i!lLMa«Jia.T._Cbv«vcr,
„ as Trustors, and recorded
Ji'lliL *i-»- i ? 5 i
. WL*— fts Entry No.
16973"
In Hook 1 2 1 S L at paRes 6 9 6
of the Offirlal KecortLt of .v.**1.!*-.
County. Utah, given to secure an Indebtedness In favor of J 2 2 £ ! * A i - ^ E l ' ^ J » L 4 i S Z £ « J ^ «
Splinter.
Joseph A. Scuthalcr and Hyra K. S e e t h a l e r
( n o w owwd
a n d l | c M ,iy
by reason of the breach of certain obligations secured thereby.
Notice of Default was recorded March 2 9 , 198A
No. - J 2 £ ?
in jjoofc 1X21
a s yMiry
at page J20JL of said Official Records. Trustoo will sell at public auction to the highest bidder for cash,
payable In lawful money of the United States at the time of sale, without warranty as to title, possesion
or encumbrances, the following described property at , 1 5 A U ^ i k J U l H ? . NprUl
, In the City of
P'^vo
, County of
U^ii
State of Utah:
All of Lot 3, Plat "A", Marjorie Manor Subdivision, Proyo, Utah, according
to tha official plat thereof ou file in the oTflce of lite itccordcr, ULah
County, Utah.

for the purpose of paying obligations secured by said Deed of Tiust Including fees, charges and expenses
of Trustee, advances, if any, under th« terms of nald DeaU Interest theieon and the unpaid principal of
the Note secured by said Deed of Trust with Interest thereon as in r.ald Note and l>y law provided.
Dated:.

Hatch A, 1985

55 I'.ast Cunt i*r
I'rovo, Utah 8A601

SKCUKITY

&)AI1STKACT CO.

Ri'X (h^llfitisoii

Its

President

, Trustee

12 (R 3-7*1

TO*?
WHEN RECORDED MAM. TO

r
N*ne
Sffcet
Address
CilyO
Stale
L

SECOND RECohDlNG
Joseph A. Seethaler
3655 Foothill Drive
Provo, Utah 84604
. S P A C E ABOVE THIS LINE FOR R E C O R D E R S U S E .

TRUSTEE'S DEED
AND ABSTRACT
THIS DEED, made by SFCURITY TITl E/COMPANY as Trustee under the hereinafter mentioned
Deed of Trust (herein called Trustee), and JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA K. SRETHAT.F.R
>
(herein called Grantee). WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, Vernon S. Cheever and Martha T. Cheever
_ a s E n t r > No
, and Recorded
Jnna 11,.-19fllby Deed of Trust dated ,
16973 .nRnnk 1918
.of Official Records, in the office of the County Recorder
.at pages
696,
nf Utah
rmmty State of Utah, did grant and convey to said Trustee upon the Trusts therein expressed, the property hereinafter described to secure, among other obligations, pa>ment of a certain promts^
sory note and interest, according to the terms thereof other sums of money advanced, and interest therqon,
and,
WHEREAS, breach and default was made under the terms of said Deed of Trust in the particulars set
forth in the Notice of Default duly served and recorded; and,
WHEREAS, the then Beneficiary or holder of said note did execute and deliver to Trustee written declaration of default and demand for sale, and,
WHEREAS, Trustee, in consequence of said declaration of default, election and demand for sale, and in
compliance with the terms of said Deed of Trust did execute its Notice of Trustee's Sale stating that it, as such
Trustee, by virtue of the authority in it vested, would sell at public auction to the highest bidder for cash, in
lawful money of the United States, the property particularly therein and hereinafter described, said proptrt)
^
being in the County of
, State of Utah, andfixingthe time and place of sale as A p r i l . 9^JL985 ^ f e
at 11*00 A M of said day, and did cause copies of said Notice to be posted for not less than twenty days
before the date of sale herein fixed, in three public places in the said City of
PrQVQ
, wherein said
property was to be sold, and also two in convptcuous places on the property to be sold and said Trustee did
cause a copy of said Notice to be published once a week for three consecutive wtcks before the date of sale
thereinfixedin The D a l l y Herald
a newspaper of general circulation, printed and published in the city or township in which said real property
is situated, the first date of such publication being .March 3» 1985
and the last date M * T ^ 17 w 1985
and
WHEREAS, all applicable statutory provisions of the State of Utah and alt of the provisions of said
Deed of Trust have been complied with as to acts to be performed and notices to be given, and
g
WHEREAS, Trustee did at the time and place of sale fixed as aforesaid, then and there sell, at public
auction, to said flranto*, Joseph A. S e e t h a l e r and Myra g . / S e S k ? £ f fi& highest bidder therefor, the
property hereinafter described, for the sum r»f* 10»000»00
paid tn cash, lawful money of the United States
by the satisfaction-P* * p o r t i o n of the
mH#.hn*w«« then secured by said Deed of Trust
NOW, THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises recited and of the sum a bene mentioned
bid and paid by Grantee, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and by virtue of the authority vested
in it by said Deed of Trust, docs, by these presents, GRANT AND CONVEY unto Grantee, but without any
covenant or warranty, express or implied, all that certain property situate in Utah
County
State of Utah, described as follows
All of Lot 3, Plat "A", Marjorie Manor Subdivision, Provo, Utaht according
to the official plat thereof on file in the office of the Recorder, Utah
County,Utah.
Re-Recorded to show correct date of sale.
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jmul Abstract
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said SECURITY TITLE COMPANV, as Trustee, has caubed its corporate
_. H>_a5_.
name and seal to be hereto affixed this , 9 t h - day of April

AND ABSTRACT
ITY TITLE/COMPANY. Trustee
Attest:

'OA/lto/

Jz^^Q^s.

Secretary Glen G. Farrer

Hat8oa

^

y
President

I; * /STATE, OKUTAKi

. day of , Aprils.
A.D. 1981
and Glen G. Farter
/^erlSnal^nieared before ™» Rex C. Katson
Rex C. Matson
\ , Cwjio'JeTnp-.Tte'ine duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said
*^.t$*'JZr
president, and he. the said
Glen G. Farrer
is the secretary
of SECURITY TITLE AjQMPAjfir^&e corporation that executed the foregoing Instrument as such Trustee
by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said Re* n. Hi farm
^> and . ' • f t f f C« Farrer
each duly acknowledge to me that said corporation
/ *V executed' the* same as such Trustee and that the seal affixed Is the seal of said corporation.

\

ires:. 6/18/1986

Gtary Public, Reaiding in ftatotafiBaaq, Utah
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KENNETH F. CLARKE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Attorney for Plaintiffs
42 North University, Suite 11
P.O. Box H
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone 801-375-291]
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VERNON S. CHEEVER and
MARTHA T. CHEEVER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED
PENDENS

LIS

vs.
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER and MYRA
K. SEETHALER, husband and
Wife, and SECURITY TITLE
AND ABSTRACT COMPANY,

Civil No. 64179

Defendants.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an action has been commenced
in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State
of Utah, by the above named Plaintiffs, Vernon S. Cheever
and Martha T. Cheever, against the Defendants, Joseph A.
Seethaler and Myra K. Seethaler, for the purpose of having
declared void that certain DEED OF TRUST, dated the 10th day
of June, 1981, wherein the' Plaintiffs are TRUSTORS, and the
Defendants, Joseph A. Seethaler and Myra K. Seethaler, are
BENEFICIARIFS; said Deed of Trust was recor^M on June 13,
1981, as entry number 16973 in book 1918 at pages 696, 697,
and 698 of the Official Records of the County Recorder of
Utah County, State of Utah.

THE OBJECT OF THE ACTION IS ALSO

to have declared by the terms of the DEED OF

TRUS"*

(immediatly

below the legal description) "At the request of Trustor, the

3eneficiary agrees to subordinate this Deed of ^rust to a
First Trust Deed for-' a loan not exceeding £4 4,000.00."

To

be a determination that the TRUSTORS have the secured interest
themselves of the first $44,000.00 of value in the said property or in the alternative tfiat they may at any time, pursuant to said DFFD OF TRUST obtain a loan from any entity,
or institution or anyone else in the amount of £44,000.00
which shall always be superior to the interest of the Beneficiaries,

T H F OBJFCT OF THIS ACTION IS ALSO to have de-

clared the duties and legal relations of the Plaintiffs and
the Defendants with regards to the said DFFD OF T RUST so that
the Plaintiffs can determine their riqhts and duties thereunder.

THE OBJECT OF THIS ACTION IS ALSO to have the DFFD

OF TRUS^ reformed or declared void based upon, including but
not limited to, the FRAUD and or MISREPRESENTATIONS of the
Beneficiaries; the particulars df which reference is made
to the file in the above entitled Court and Cause,

^he pre-

mises affected by this suit are situated in the County of
Utah, State of Utah, and are described as follows, to wit:
All of lot 3, Plat ,fA", MARJORIE MANOR SUBDIVISION,
Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof
on file in the office of the Recorder^ U t W County,
Utah.
•Summary Judgment was entered against Plaintiffs and
in Favor of Defendants on the 30th of November, 198*.
Plaintiffs have appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.

The

Case number of the Case on appeal is Supreme Court No. 203^2.
The case is active and pending.
*fIhis paragraph is an amendment to the original IIS PFNTFNS filed
February 29, 1984 as Instrument #6318, Book 2119, Pago ^g and
50, records of Utah County. State of Utah,

Signed for purpose of Jura

Signed for purpose of acknowledgement
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s

T ^ S t e y of

April,

1985.
/>

i/)(i4;0l(L
My Commission E x p i r e s :
£ JP->V

(Zd-(L./n>^>

NOTARY P U B L I C - ^
UibU^
R e s i d i n g a t : ! r&vO, <*"-«-'<~

STATE OF UTAH )
:SS

County of Utah )
On the c/

day of

April, 1985, personally appeared

before nv KENNETH F. CLARKE the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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HIDDEN MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
T.

Dee MILLS, Milton C. Christenaen. aka
Milton A. Christenaen, Paradise Valley
Estates, Inc., Lake Mills Company, a
Limited Partnership, Carole Lee Chriatensen. Environmental Resources, Inc.,
et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Noa. 15027, 15157. and 15188.
Supreme Court of Utah.

defendant, and defendant could not now
attempt to alter that determination so as to
recover value of improvements made as occupying claimant after date of plaintiff's
option, and (4) occupying claimant having
made no showing that it acted in good faith
in making improvements on subject property, it was not entitled to compensation for
said improvements.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated
in part.
Crockett, J., concurred but dissented in
part and filed opinion.

Jan. 2, 1979.
Plaintiff filed action in equity seeking
specific performance of an option to purchase realty. The Fourth District Court,
Wasatch County, D. Frank Wilkina, J., dismissed action and plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court, Ellett. J., 29 Utah 2d 469,
511 P.2d 737, reversed and directed granting of specific performance. On remand,
the trial court ordered defendant to transfer property to plaintiff. When plaintiff
was unable to enforce judgment against
defendant due to interim conveyances,
pUinliff tiled aupplementai complaint and
joined as additional party defendants those
persons who acquired interests in subject
land subsequent to entry of initial judgment of trial court The Fourth District
Court, Wasatch County, Ernest F. Baldwin,
J., entered judgment of specific performance in favor of plaintiff, subject to defendant's entitlement to compensation (or improvement made as an occupying claimant,
and defendants appealed. The Supreme
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) lis pendens
continued U> be effective after judgment
and pending appeal, and thus defendants
were thereby charged with constructive notice of plaintiff's claims prior to their acquisition of any interests in land; (2) record
also supported trial court's conclusion that
defendants had actual notice of plaintiffs
appeal; (3) trial court's determination, in
proceeding following remand, ordering specific performance was res judicata as to
amount payable by plaintiff under option to

1. Lis Pendens *=»11(2)
Lis pendens continued to be effective
after judgment and pending appeal. U.C.
A. 1953, 78 4 0 2.
2. U s Pendens *=•!
Term "lis pendens" signifies pending
litigation and so-called "doctrine of lis pendens" confirms power of courts over property during pendency of legal proceedings.
U.C.A.1953, 78 40-2.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Lla Pendens *»22(1)
Lis pendens charges public with notice
of outstanding claims and causes one who
deals with property involved in pending litigation to do so at his peril. U.C.A.1953,
78^40^2.
4. Lis Pendens *=»1
Sole purpose of recording a lis pendens
is to give constructive notice of pendency of
proceedings which may be derogatory to an
owner's title or right to possession. U.C.A.
1953, 7a 40 2.
6. Us Pendens «=»22(2)
One who takes with full knowledge
that property taken is subject of ongoing
litigation acquires only grantor's interest
therein, subject to whatever disposition
court might make of it.
6. Appeal and Error •=•1197
Where a judgment is reversed and remanded with specific instruction or di-

HIDDEN MEADOWS
UuutM
rections, case stands in lower court precisely
as it did before a trial was had in the first
instance.
7. U s Pendens *=»11(2)
Fact that plaintiff failed to furnish a
supersedeas bond after filing an appeal
from trial court's dismissal ot its action tor
specific performance of an option to purchase realty did not render notice given by
previously recorded lis pendens ineffectual.
U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 73(d).
8. Records *=»19
Those who deal in real property interests are bound by those matters that appear
of record and one may not be penalized or
deprived of effectiveness of such notice aa
is imparted by record simply because of
some unrelated action or inaction of his or
others.
t. Appeal and Error *~458(1)
Plaintiff, which appealed trial court's
dismissal of its action for specific performance of an option to purchase realty, was
not bound to furnish supersedeas; such was
merely available to him. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 73(d).
19. Appeal and Error *»485(1)
Purpose and effect of supersedeas is to
restrain successful party and lower court
from taking affirmative action to enforce a
judgment or decree. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 73(d).
11. U s Pendens *~11(2)
Since lis pendens filed in connection
with suit tor specific performance of an
option to purchase realty was still effective
after judgment and pending appeal, parties
which subsequently acquired interest in
subject land subsequent to entry ot initial
judgment of trial court were thereby
charged with constructive notice ot plaintiff's claim prior to their acquisition of any
interest in land. U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2.
12. Appeal and Error «=»I214
Record supported trial court's conclusion, on supplemental complaint following
remand, that defendants had actual knowl-
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edge of plaintiff's appeal from trial court's
original dismissal ot its action for specific
performance of an option to purchase realty
and hence defendants, which acquired interests in subject (and subsequent to entry ot
initial judgment of trial court, were
charged with knowledge of fact that first
judgment was subject to being reversed.
13. Judgment «=» 586(2)
Trial court's determination, in proceeding following remand, ordering specific performance of option to purchase realty in
favor of plaintiff was res judicata as to
amount payable by plaintiff under option to
defendant, and defendant could not subsequently attempt to alter that determination
so as to recover value of improvements
made as occupying claimant after date of
plaintiffs option. U.C.A.1953, 67 6 1 et
seq.
14. Improvements «=»3
"Occupying Claimants" statute ameliorates strict common-law rule that owner is
entitled to improvements placed by another
upon his property, and is baaed upon equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment U.C.A.
1953, 6 7 - * - ! et aeq., 57-6-2.
15. Improvements *=»4(1)
An occupying claimant is required by
statute to establish two elements before he
can recover for improvements placed on
real property by him: (1) that he has color
of title; and (2) that he placed improvements in good faith; if he fails to establish
either one, he cannot recover. U.C.A.1953,
67-6k 1 et seq.
16. Appeal and Error •=» 1008.1(3)
Rules of appellate review generally
preclude the Supreme Court from substituting its judgment for that of trial court on
factual issues.
17. Trial «-388(1)
Trial court is bound to make factual
determinations to support its legal conclusions and said findings must be supported
by substantial evidence.
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18. Improvement* *=»4(2)
Occupying claimant having made no
showing that it acted in good faith in making improvements on subject property, it
was not entitled to compensation for said
improvement*. U.C.A.1953, 57-6-1 et seq.
19. Improvement* *=»4(2)
One who relies upon rights afforded by
statute as an occupying claimant is charged
with burden of demonstrating his good
faith in placing improvements in face of an
adverse claim. U.C.A.1953, 67-6-1 et seq.
20. Improvements *=»4(2)
Occupying claimant's reliance on accuracy of trial court's initial ruling dismissing
action for specific performance of an option
to purchase
alty was not sufficient to
justify a dele mination of good faith on
part of occupy,ng claimant in placing improvements in face of an adverse claim on
subject property. U.C.A 1953, 57-6-1 et
seq.

refused to honor plaintiffs option which
resulted in the filing of the initial complaint
and the recording of a Lis Pendens in the
office of the county recorder. Thereafter,
Mills conveyed various interests in the land
in question to defendants, Paradise Valley
Estates, Inc., (hereinafter "Paradise") Lake
Hills Company, a limited partnership, (hereinafter "Lake") Carole Lee Davis, Environmental Resources, Inc., and International
Environmental Sciences, a limited partnership (hereinafter "International"). Those
conveyances were apparently with the consent of Christensen as he was president of
Paradise, the principal of Lake and became
the husband of Carole Lee Davis (a partner
in International).

This is an action in equity seeking specific
performance of an option to purchase realty

The initial trial of the specific performance action resulted in a judgment of dismissal declaring the option void and an
appeal was filed to this Court. Supersedeas
bond was fixed in the sum of $50,000, however, none was ever furnished. This Court
reversed and directed the granting of specific performance of the option.1 On remand, the trial court on August 28, 1973
ordered Mills to transfer the property to
plaintiff for the sum of $86,200. In the
interim between the entry of the initial
judgment and the order of August 28, 1973,
Lake and Paradise conveyed the land in
question to defendant, international, which
proceeded to make certain improvements on
the land and also made certain conveyances
of various portions thereof. When plaintiff
was unable to enforce the judgment against
Mills due to the interim conveyances, it
filed a supplemental complaint and joined
as additional parties defendant those persons who had acquired any interest in the
subject land subsequent to the entry of the
initial judgment of the trial court

Defendants, Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills
(hereinafter "Mills"), granted the option in
question in favor of plaintiff's predecessor
in interest. Sultscquently, Mills granted a
similar option to defendant, Milton C. Christensen (hereinafter "Christensen"). Mills

After a trial on the issues raised by the
supplemental complaint, the trial court specifically found that all defendants had actual knowledge of the appeal pending in this
Court prior to their acquisition of any purported interest in the land and, since the Lis

John G. Marshall. Salt Lake City, for Dee
Mills, Evelyn I. Mills, and Evelyn Mills
Trust.
Hanson & Garrett, Salt Lake City, for
Intern. Environ. Sciences.
Leonard H Eusscn and James L Sadler.
Salt Lake City, for Milton Christensen, Paradise Valley Estates, Lake Mills, Carole
Christensen and Environmental Resources.
Cullen Y. Christensen, Provo, for plaintiff
and respondent.
HALL, Justice:

I. Hidden Meadowa Development Company vMill$. et at, 29 Utah 2d 469. 511 P 2d 737 (1973)
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Pendens remained unreleased, they had
constructive notice of plaintiff's interest as
well. The trial court further found that
International had made improvements upon
the land consisting of land leveling and
clearing, installation of culverts, grading of
roads, installation of ditches and remodeling
and addition to a house situated thereon, all
of which had a value of $35,000. The trial
court also found that International had undertaken certain planning, platting and rezoning activities with respect to the use of
the land, hut declined to place any value
thereon as an improvement. Accordingly,
judgment of specific performance was entered in favor of plaintiff, subject to International's entitlement to compensation in
the amount of $35,000 for improvement
made as an occupying claimant*
Mills, Christensen and International filed
separate appeals which have been previously consolidated.' The basic Issue raised by
each appeal bears upon the propriety of the
trial court's determination that the recordation of a Lis Pendens precludes the conveyance of a marketable title to lands that are
the subject of a pending appeal. Both International and Mills raise additional issues
which hear u|>on their res|>ective positions
as occupying claimants, the former contending it is entitled to a further award for
expenditures attributable to its efforts to
rczone the land, and the latter contending
that the trial court erred in refusing to
receive proffered evidence of improvement
they made to the land.
Plaintiff cross-appeals, challenging the
award to International as an occupying
claimant on the ground that the improvements were not made in good faith
(1) First addressing the Lis Pendens issue, we note that appellants simply urge
that Lis Pendens has no effect or duration
after judgment and pending appeal. A review of the basic doctrine of Lis Pendens,
2. Pursuant to U C A . 1953. 57 6 I. et seq
3. Various other named defendantV Interests
were previously compromised and settled so as
to obviate their appeal Also, the appeal of
Paradise, take. Carole tee Christensen (for-

our statutory enactment pertaining thereto,
and the prior pronouncements of this Court,
fail to sustain their contentions.
[2,3) Literally, the term "lis pendens"
signifies pending litigation and the so-called
"doctrine of lis pendens" confirms the power of the courts over property during the
pendency of legal proceedings. It charges
the public with notice of outstanding claims
and causes one who deals with property
involved in pending litigation to do so at his
peril.4
U.C.A., 1953, 78-40 2 provides as follows:
78-40-2. Lis pendens.—In any action
effecting the title to, or the right of
possession of, real property the plaintiff
at the time of filing the complaint or
thereafter, and the defendant at the time
of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any
time afterward, may file for record with
the recorder of the county in which the
property or some part thereof is situated
a notice of the pendency of the action,
containing the names of the parties, the
object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that county
affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a
purchaser encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of th* pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against
parties designated by their real names.
[Emphasis added.]
The fact that the foregoing statutory
provision allows the recordation of a Lis
Pendens at any time clearly preserves its
integrity after judgment and pending appeal.
Consistent with said statutory provision,
this Court long ago recognized the on-going
potency and effectiveness of a recorded lis
pendens after judgment. In Larsen v. Gaamerly Carole tee Oavls), and Environmental
Resources will hereafter be referred to that of
"Christensen" for the purposes of convenience
since the Issues raised are Identical
4. See 51 Am Jur 2d tla Pendent. Sec I
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beq?* it was held that where real property
was levied upon under an execution as the
property of the judgment debtor, the filing
of a lis pendens notice of a suit by the
grantor of the judgment debtor one day
before the execution sale imparted notice to
the purchaser at such execution sale of all
plaintiffs right, title and interest Conse
quently the deed executed under such cir
cumstanoes was held to be null and void and
was cancelled for want of a bona fide or
innocent purchaser
•

(4, 5] The sole purpose of recording a lis
pendens is to give constructive notice of the
pendency of proceedings which may be derogatory to an owners title or right to
possession* One who takes with full
knowledge that the property taken is the
subject of on going litigation acquires only
the grantor s interest therein subject to
whatever disposition the court might make
of i t '

"failure" to accomplish any number of im
aginable things in no way alters the inescapable fact that a duly recorded lis pen
dens serves as notice to all persons It is an
elementary principle of real estate law that
those who deal in property interests are
bound by those matters that appear of rec
ord and one may not be penalized or deprived of the effectiveness of such notice as
is imparted by the record simply because of
some unrelated action or inaction of his or
others Secondly, plaintiff was not bound
to furnish su|>ersedea8 Such was merely
available to him •• The fact that none was
furnished is of no consequence in this case
This is found to be so when it is observed
that the purpose and effect of supersedeas
is to restrain the successful party and the
lower court from taking affirmative action
to enforce a judgment or decree 11 The
judgment involved here was one of dismissal and, as such, was self-executing Hence,
it was not the subject of any enforcement
and the failure to perfect supersedeas could
in no way affect i t u

[6] The rule is well settled that, where a
judgment is reversed and remanded with
specific instruction or directions, the case
stands in the lower court precisely as it did
before a trial was had in the first instance •
Hence, that very situation existed in the
instant cane as a result of our reversal and
remand with directions to grant specific
performance* Also by so reversing the
Court has already recognized the full effec
tiveness of lis pendens pending appeal

[11] In light of the foregoing analysis, it
cannot be said that a lis pendens does not
endure after judgment and pending appeal,
and we so hold Consequently, the trial
court correctly determined that all appcl
lants were thereby charged with constructive notice of plaintiff's claims prior to their
acquisition of any interests in the land in
question

|7—10] Appellants further contend that
since plaintiff failed to furnish aSupersede
as bond it was not entitled to a stay of
proceedings and that such failure in some
way rendered the notice given by the re
corded lis pendens ineffectual
For two
very obvious reasons, that contention is
without merit First and foremost the

[12] The propriety of the trial court's
conclusion that appellants had actual notice
of plaintiffs appeal is also borne out by the
record which reflects the fact that at all
times material to these proceedings, Chris
tensen was intertwined with all of the appellants and was the apparent alter ego of
certain of them He was president of Para

I

43 U U h 203 134 P 885 (1913)

19

Rule 73(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

•

Hansen v Kohler

11

4 Am Jur 2d Appeal and Error Section 371

7
•
9

Glynn v Dubln
(1962)

Utah 550 P 2d 186 (1976)

13 Utah 2d 163 369 P 2d 910

Larsen v Gasberg

supra footnote 5

Hidden Meadows Development
Mills supra footnote I

Company

12 Gumherts v East Oak Street Hotel Co 404
III 386 88 N E 2d 883 (l<H9) Western United
Dairy Co v Miller 40 IIIApp2d 403 189
N E 2d 786 (1963)

dise and Environmental Resources, Inc
which was the general partner of Environmental, a limited partnership, and he married Carole Lee Davis on February 16, 1973
Those facts are sufficient to support the
trial court's conclusion that the appellants
had actual knowledge of plaintiff's appeal
and hence were charged with knowledge of
the fact that the first judgment was subject
to being reversed u
[13] Turning now to the issue presented
by the appeal of Mills which hears upon
their entitlement to the value of improvements made as occupying claimants after
the date of plaintiff's option to purchase, it
appears that their contentions are without
substance This is so by reason of the fact
that these matters were before the trial
court in the proceeding conducted following
our earlier remand
In that proceeding,
plaintiff and Mills were both parties, the
same property was involved, and the
amount to be paid by plaintiff to Mills to
acquire the property was determined No
appeal was taken from the order of Specific
Performance of August 28 1973 Such prior determination is res judicata as to the
amount payable by the plaintiff under the
option to Mills, who cannot now attempt to
alter that former decision , 4
The final iseut requiring our attention
involves the appeal of International which
seeks to enhance its award for improve
ments as occupying claimant and the cross
appeal of plaintiff which asserts the trial
court erred in making any award at all for
improvements
The Legislature has seen fit to temper
the rigid rules of the common law by enact
ing an "Occupying Claimants' statute M
which provides in pertinent part as follows
57-6 1 Where an occupant of real
estate has color of title thereto and in
IS McClung v Hohl 10 Kan App 93 61 P 507
(1900) Patterson v Old Dominion Trust Co
844 Va 597 140 S E 810 (1927) Glynn v
Dubin supra footnote 7
14 Matthews v Matthews
P 2 d III (1942)

102 Utah 428

v
15

UCA
SSOH4—27

19*53 57 ^ I et seq

132

good faith has made valuable improvements thereon, and is afterwards in a
proper action found not to be the owner,
no execution shall issue to put the plaintiff in possession of the same after the
filing of a complaint as hereinafter provided, until the provisions of this chapter
have been complied with
[Emphasis
added]
67-6- 2 Such complaint must set forth
the grounds on which the defendant seeks
relief, stating as accurately as practicable
the value of the real estate, exclusive of
the improvements thereon made by the
claimant or his grantors, and the value of
such improvements
The issues joined
thereon must be tried as in law actions,
and the value of the real estate and of
such improvements must be separately
ascertained on the trial
[14] The fortgoiag sections ameliorate
the strict common law rule that the owner
is entitled to the improvements placed by
another upon his property, and is based
upon the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment '•
[15] An occupying claimant is required
by our statute to establish two elements
before he can recover for improvements
placed on real property by him (1) that he
has color of title, and (2) that he placed the
improvements in good faith If he fails to
establish either one, he cannot rawer "
A number of jurisdictions including
Utah, have announced the broad proposition
that no recovery can be had for improvemenU made with the knowledge of the
existence of an adverse claim which subsequently proves to be superior to that of the
occupant 11 The eases of Reimann v
If

Reimann v Baum 115 UUh 147 203 P2d
387 (1949)

17 Doyle v West Temple Terrace Co 47 Utah
238 152 P 1180(1915) Day v Jones 112 Utah
286 187 P2d 181 (1947)
IS See 41 Am Jur 2d Improvements Section 17
for citations
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Baum
and Erickson v. Stokesm
both
stand for the proposition that one who
places improvements after notice of an adverse claim is precluded from recovering
the value thereof.
The facta in Erickson v. Stokes are strikingly similar to those in the case before us.
There, Erickson, a purchaser at tax sale,
sued to quiet title and obtained a judgment.
Thereafter Stokes sought to intervene and
moved to «t aside the decree and re-open
the case, s< >ting forth by affidavit that she
had a substantial interest in the property
and a good defense to the action
Her
application for intervention was denied and
she then sued Erickson to quiet title, recording a lis pendens. She was ultimately
successful in her suit, having shown the tax
sale was defective. After the filing of her
quiet title action and during its pendency,
Erickson proceeded to construct improvements The court in denying Erickson'a
claim for the value of the improvements
observed that he had notice of the adverse
claim prior to the placement of the improvements and in the absence of a showing
of good faith, (which burden was upon him)
he could not recover.
{IS, 17) The rules of appellate review
generally preclude this Court from substituting its judgment for that of the trial
court on factual issues. However, the trial
court is bound to make factual determinations in support its legal conclusions and
said findings must be supported by substantial evidence.
118) A review of the record in this matter reveals that International made no
showing that it acted in good faith in making the improvements and the court's findings of fact are entirely silent in that regard, leaving nothing to support its conclusion of law that International was entitled
to an award of $35,000.
It is also to be noted that the conclusion
of the trial court that International had
actus/ and constructive notice of plaintiffs
It. Supra, footnote 16
2t. 120 Utah 653. 237 P 2d 1012 (1951)

claims is wholly inconsistent with the concept of good faith on the part of International.
(19) As was noted supra, the doctrine of
lis pendens imposes upon one who deals in
property, which is the subject of pending
litigation, the burden of doing so at his
peril. Consequently, one who relics upon
the rights afforded by statute as an occupying claimant is charged with the burden of
demonstrating his good faith in placing improvements in the face of an adverse claim.
(20) International's sole explanation of
good faith was that it relied on the accuracy of the ruling in the first trial under the
facts of this case Such is not sufficient to
justify a determination of good faith
The judgment is affirmed except that
portion thereof which awards $35,000 to
International as an occupying claimant is
vacated. Plaintiff is entitled to costs.
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and
W1LKINS. JJ . concur.
CROCKETT, Justice:
dissenting in part)

(Concurring, but

I agree with all that is said in the main
opinion, except that I dissent from those
portions dealing with the reversal of the
award of $35,000 to the defendant as an
occupying claimant. That reversal appears
to be based upon the statement that "no
recovery can be had for improvements
made with ihe knowledge uf the existence
of an adverse claim which subsequently
proves to be su|>erior to that of the occupant." That statement is too broad. If
literally applied, it would in many instances
defeat the purpose of the occupying claimant statute. It is submitted that an examination of the cases cited in support thereof'
will reveal that the rule as stated is all
right as applicable to the particular facts
therein, but is not necessarily inconsistent
with what is said in this dissent.
It requires little reflection to realize that
if a claimant must have title which ultiI. See footnote 18 main opinion

mately proves to be superior, he would have
no need to recover for improvements placed
on the land. It is only when he has a bona
fide claim, constituting color of title, and in
good faith places improvements on the land,
and bis claim of title later proves to be
inferior to some other claim, that he needs
that protection.
Consistent with the foregoing is the language of the statutes themselves. Sees.
57-6-1 and 2 indicate that the occupant can
recover if "in good faith" he makes valuable improvements on the property and is
afterwards "found not to be the owner." It
is obvious that this contemplates a situation
where there is an outstanding "adverse
claim which subsequently proves to be superior to that of the occupant."
The main opinion correctly states that the
doctrine is based on unjust enrichment of
the person who proves to be the true owner.
This enrichment entails something which is
a benefit to the land and thus to the true
owner.
Whether recovery may be had may well
depend upon several circumstances, including the nature of the improvement placed
on the property. Conceivably it could be a
dam, or a bridge or some other improvement essential to preserve the land itself, as
contrasted with something which would improve it only for the pur|>ose and use of the
occupying claimant. In this case the view
of the trial c«urt WM that the leveling and
clearing of the land, installation of ditches
and culverts, grading of roads and remodeling of the house were such improvements of
the land itself as to constitute an unjust
enrichment to the plaintiff.
The critical questions for determination
in this case: whether the defendant as an
occupying claimant placed the improvements thereon in good faith, and whether
they unjustly enriched the plaintiff by improving his land, are necessarily questions
of fact the determination of which should
be left to the trial court. This is affirmed
by Sec. 57 6 2 which states that "the issues
joined thereon must be tried as in law actions
."
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Inasmuch as those critical issues have
been tried and determined by the trial
court, and there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence to support his finding and judgment, it is my opinion that under the standard rule of review they should not be
overturned.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.

T. Val CHRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
UTAH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY, • corporatlon, and Union Pacific Railroad, a
corporation, Defendant* and Respondents).
No. 15751.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 24, 1979.

Grantee brought suit for damages for
alleged breach of covenants under special
warranty deed. The Fourth District "Court,
Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., entered
summary judgment in favor of grantor, ami
grantee appealed. The Supreme Court,
Hall, J., held that summary judgment in
favor of grantor was precluded by existence
of factual issues concerning when grantee
received notice of existence of encumbrance
and whether grantee was ever evicted from
property.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Covenants *=»110
Cause of action for a breach of certain
implied covenants in warranty deed remains
viable for six years. U.CA.1953, 78 1223(2).

KENNETH F. CLARKE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Atttorney for Plaintiff
42 North University Ave, Suite 11
P.O. Box H
P r o v o , Utah 8 4 6 0 3
Telephone 801-375-2911
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VERNON S. CHEEVER, MARTHA
T. CHEEVER, UTAH COUNTY
PACKING COMPANY, INC. , and
COLES BROTHERS, I N C . ,

STIPULATION

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs

*

C i v i l No.

20,362

JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, MYRA
K. SEETHALER, and SECURITY
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
/

WHEREAS, the Appellant filed a MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PAGE IN
BRIEF AND FILE EXHIBIT 7, dated the 12th day of April, 1985 and the
same has not yet been scheduled for hearing;
AND WHEREAS, Appellant having filed a MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES, dated the 12th day of April, 1985 in support of
SUBSTITUTING PAGE 2 6 OF BRIEF, a copy of which is attached hereto;
NOW THEREFORE IT IS AGREED, that hearing on the same need not
be had at this time and that the Appellant may incorporate the matters heretofore set forth into its REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS and
that tb«» Respondents, may have the option of replying to the same
if they file a Response to REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS.

That oral

arguement on the same may be had at the time of Oral Argument in the

above entitled case,
DATED this £

day of M$y, 1985.

ETH F. ObARKE
Attorney for Appellant

PAVIID LAMDE-RT '
Attorney for Respondent

-2- STIPULATION

VERNON CHEEVER, Exhibit 9, PR 760, Paragraph 2; Affidavit of
MARTHA T. CHEEVER, Exhibit 18; Affidavit of BRUCE COLES, Exhibit
19.
Appellants Third Cause of Action, is also viable; the trier
of the facts may determine that there is no contract.
Appellants Fourth Cause of Action, is equitable in nature
and should be sustained.

So also as to Appellants FIFTH CAUSE

OF ACTION.
CONCLUSION AMD PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
The Court should rule that S U M M A P Y JUDGMENT, was improperly
granted, and the judgment of Lower Court reversed with all
causes of action in place and that tho Lower Court should seriously look to determining if the prevailing party should be
awarded Attorney Fees pursuant to Section 78-27-56 of the Utah
Code.
That in the event the Appellants are successful on Appeal,
That Plaintiffs be allowed to file a Cause of Action for damages
for the loss of the use of their property and for quieting Title
to the Property in Plaintiffs by allov/ing amendments to Plaintiffs
pleadings.
RESPECTFULLY^ SUBMITTED*,

KENNETH p .

ClJVF^KE

ttornoy for Plaintiffs/Appellants
/

!
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<«««%

per And Heed to enter Into a contract with I in July, 1800 In the absence of Ilolbtook « n „
Jungk and l-ahfan for a Jim:* number nt »liwp, | Dugglna and Scott: ami It was agreed n*
for future deliver/, but concealed from them, Cropiier and ltet<«l shoultl pay ba< k the $»oooo
a* they claim, that be wan himself Interested adtnnced, ami $r».o*K) as damages for breach ^
In thi» pun hate, or that he was a partner wltb mntratt
This auui waa paid baik e lCe JJ
Jungk and Fabian. Se-ott represented to Crop- about $8.<m.
Junjrk and Fabian then w»J
per and Heed Lii.it Jie t-ould conltact with Jungk I to Provo. and presented Uieir claim to U^
ami Talilan at a price much larger than they brook aud DuuRlna, but no disclosure was w
could be purchased for. He flunlly proposed a any time made to tlictii of Scott's particle
partnet ship with Ctopper and lW\t\ to furulsh tlon on both sides of the contract. I b U fac(
the sheep to Jungk and I'ablau
The con
was concealed from Uie s t u d i e s . It w > |
tract waa to be In their name, and be waa to ba agreed that Cropper and Heed should make n,e
a silent partner. and Interested In tbe profits. three notes for f7.000. aud that Uolbrook « nii
H e waa to pun base the sheep at a rale that Ihigxlns should ludorse them aa they bad l^
would make a profit, and advised them where dorsed tbe contract, in contluuaUon. and ^
he could Ret the sheep
Under those Induce- pursuance of their liability aa sureties. Xbe
ments Cropper and He* d entered utto tin agree- notes were made and Indorsed, and are the
ment Willi Jungk and Fabian licciuiltcr 24, notes in s u i t
Cropper tc-tlncd that be knew
1*<ku by with h tbey were to di liver lu July, or suspected, tiefore the notes were g l i c n , i^
ISlki to Jungk and I abliui frfKl sin ep at a cer- Bcott waa Interested with Junsk aud FnbUm.
tain price, Jn certain places In Southern Utah
Icsllinony was offered tending to HIIOW that
In February, ISInl n not her similar contract Fnblnu bad notice of Scott a duplli Ity with hit
w a s made under similar < In iiinshinccs Scott firm, and allegetl secret dealings with Juugk,
waa Interested as a partner on iNdh sides. his partner, lu .fuiy
'lestlntouy naa also of
Clrop|»er *nd l(oi>d clsliti that they did not know fered tending to show tbat J tingle ami Fublso,
tbat be *us lutciested with Jungk and Fabian. [ or one of them, knew that ("topper, Heed, and
On the i gnlng of (be contriicts, 15.000 was nd j Scott owned sheep that were at Oasis lu I88tj
vaneed t y Jungk aud Fnblan on each contrail, or 181)1, when Fnhlnn was there, before ti*
and Cropper and Heed were reiiulred to give j notes were glren; that Cropiier aud lle»d also
sureties for due perform nice on their pirt
knew Hint Siott waa buying hheep for Jungk
Uolbrook and Dnggtus w e i e offere<I as such and Fabian; and Hint Scott at t< d as agt ut for
sureties, and, being accepted. Jungk nud Fa
Junsk and l<ablnn In proi urlng the alguntiirei
Man directed S«-ott to go with C>op|»cr and i of Uolbrook and Uugglns. as their sureties oa
Heed to Provo. ns their represents t h e and get , | the sheep eoulrnct
Stott's name does not ap^
Uolbrook and Dugglna to sign the guaiantlea j pear on either of tbe uotea or contract, except
AH these parties went to Proto, soil* Ifed and that Scott tudorsed a note of Cropper nnd Reed
ohtaloed llolbntok nud tluggtus as sureties for j for H.&00, given In settlement, also a $G00 aote,
Oiopptr and Heed. Siott biking mi nctlve part i given In settlement, with h plaintiffs regarded
in the conversation and In bringing a tout the j as equal to Scott'a pmtlt lu the sheep dtllr
result but bis Inlet est In toth sides of the cim
cretl in tbe early port of the contiatt
These
tra<t WHS not divulged to the nun-lies
fled
noles rornied part of the consideration paid
linwk sud Duggins weie ol<l accpniiulauces of I pin In I Iff 8 at tbe time of the settlement, ouMJi
Cropper and Heed
Bcott was a slntugtr \ I of the notes In suit
When tbe tlnee uott a feQ
The partnership contract between Scott and due, deftudants Uolbrook nnd Dugglns ItaiuetJ
Cropper and Heed, of Noviinhcr, 1SS0, w.ia not J for tbe first time that Scott was a partner
placed In writing until Mm eh 7, I8JHJ
ft rends with both Crup|>er and Hoed and Jungk anil
a s follows "'I bis sKieeiiient nmde nud enteted Fabian, and Hint he was lntcrcst<>d in the con
ttitn by and between Ciop|»er, Heed, nn I Scott, tract, to Uieir detrlmcut, ami leftistd pa)merit
• a partners dealing In est lie, abet p. and n n ! A trial wan had. and Ju.lgm. ut rendered ng dost
estate; tbey each one ngtee with eat b other Cropper ami Heed ou a former bearing Plainto buy ami sell on COUIIIIIKHIOII, nud share equal
tiffs appeal.
ly In profits and los* on all real entitle nnd tatThe cnuit refti*<d to Instruct tbe Juty to reatle and ex(HU>c* of bundling the twine; to der a verdict lu favor of plaintiffs but Instruct
alia re In two coiitiiuls t>f (-hup nuide by Ciop- ed Hie Jury In effect Hint If tbe tlefi udants knew
per ami Heed to lungk ami I a b d n
The paid Hint Jungk. Fabian, aud Scott were partners
Bcott is to d u l d o all profits made in atlltu,;, nnd that Cmpper, Heed, anil Siott were part
ami the said Cropper aud Heed IM to divide all in rs B In n tin j Kigncd the note, they would bt
prollls ma do In biljlug, should there be any, iMiitnd. and t i n t the burden to show that the;
ami to woik to one another's Interest In the did not know It waa upon defendants, tbnt if
entire bu»lm ss as iiartmrs
Crop|ier and the Jury found Hint, at tbe time the conlmctr
Heed
B \ \ S c o l t " Jungk and I a b h n hud were guarantied by defendants. 8«ott was In
ID the meantime mnile a con ti net to full sheep, terested on tmtb allies of the contract, aud aT»»
r r h l n g on their con I r net with Scott, but the I • partner of Jungk and Fslilnn for the pun"**
mat l e t price had rist n a t o t e the eoulrnct price I of buying aheep, and ot Cmpper and Hied for
Scott failed lu |>erf»riuiiia; his ngic-cmcnt nllh j the puri>oae of delivering ahtep to Jungk a*1
Cropper and Heed, ami the* with Jungk and I Fabian, aud thai defenduuts were Iguotaiit of
I iil>'in (t»H»>i'ii|
\ t | i i <• i.ttitt t'luppei n u l l siith rein (Ions when Hnj signed the coiilrid
It. vd ami Jungk ami Fabian met at l>e*ciel | and nolea, ami Uiat Jungk and Fabian, or &

Ut»b>

JUNUK ». HOLIlIiOOIC.

. 0f thern, knew al the time of KU«II sign''** by defendants as s m e t b s for Ctop|»er iiml
'ued tbat Bcott was a pat tin r, mid htteiesfisl
Ith Cropper and Heetl In lbe two HIKH p tsui
* t* and that they (oiieealetl sin li fact fiom
'he' * fcndaiilH, tbe Jur> sliotilil (lint for d e
Irtiilnntit; that S ' o t l s kiiowbtlge Hint be w a s
, parbici>r In Ixdh piuUictshlps for Uie piii|Htses
- - |" iroidd not be kuowl<s|gt> of or notice to
l , M , t tH
iaiigfc I U H | Fahi'"t>
' ' >"Hmletlge of
L , « rould not be Imputed to Jungk ami Fuji n timt If Jungk ami Fnblnu, or ell Iter of
hpin. knew or bad iiollte lM>ft»te defendants
\fin«'l *•"* < > o l , t r , "t of Sc«»tt s InlereHt wllb
rmi>lM r ' " " , , , , M N | , n "" , H,M *•'•' c o , l l t , a ' , B , 4 v , m
tliclrdul) to Infoi m tbe defend'iiits of the same,
nti their m glint to do so would lie a fin ml ou
"iiftndnnts and In that ensc defendants would
not IK* 1 , n , , M niiU'<" t h r . v h , , , ' w o f s , , o t t H •"*
nn'«t ' r o , , B W H M P "" , ' r MMiiee; that imlbe doi§
pot mean actual and dliect Infoi unit Ion
If a
ptirty I" l»«»t "l»«» lut|u»ry aa lo a pmtitular
fmt Ihen he Is d u n g e d 'n Inw u l l h whatever
Inquiry nlll dls< h>s<' 'J be lourt gave othei IttulriK Hons with refereme to the noles Is'litg in
(Mtittlntiatlou of (he contract of g u i r a u t ) ; that
If, liefore the <v7idi«cls were fulfilled one pint
ner of Jungk and Fabian entere<l Into o part
nershlp with R<«ed ami Cropi»er. and this fn<t
wn« purposely concealed from tbe surell s nnd
thev dltl not kuow nUnit It, this would rden>e
them u(H»n the guaranty; and, If the notes were
simply s continuation of Ibelr supposed liability
on Ibe original continct, then the defembmts
•re not liable, wilens Uiey knew at the signing
of the notes of the double n tolJon of Scott to
the parties to tbe sheep contract.
Itennett, llnrkuess, How at & Hradley and
ttllllniiiM, \ n n Colt & Sutherland, for np|n>!
lauts. Hruwu & lleitdersou, for rcHpoiiileiils
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per. Reed and Rcolt were part it. i s In the put
chnxe nnd sale of Hheep to lungk and Fab an,
that Crupper nisi Ittssl kntw, or w«ie charge
able with not h e , (bat Siott wns a partner or
Interested in tbe contract for tbe pun IIUM» of
sheep wllb Jungk ami I nbinn. that dt fend
ants Ibdhrook and I>iigglns were wboll) Ignorant of the double relation existing IMIUCVII
Scolt and the two firms at the time the) plgiietl
the gunnifiM cemtrac t and tbe uotea given la
puiNUiince of It, nntl would not l u u e c x c i u l e d
tbe conti-nt t or Indorsed the notes bad tbe true
stnte of f m t s been made known to litem by
either tirm, Hint the eoms>nlineut of these fnc la
and circumstances immcdintclv nffet leti tho
llabiill) of the s u n ties; thai Cropper ami Heetl
ami lungk and Fabian fraudulently withheld
from Ibe sureties Die true stnie of facts exist
Ing Itelwem them and Scott when lite indorsements we're made; that each of these firms
knew that Scott was tin Ir partner In tbe trans
m l Ions with (he other (Inn and thai Ibe sure
He" were milking tbe IndorM mi nt in Ignorant e
of tbe relation, that lungk and Fabian sent
Scott, as their agent nnd n p n s i n i n t h c to oh
tnln (lie slgn-ilines of llollnisik nud H u g g i n g
to Ibe c o n t r o l
that Scolt was their partner
at tbe time, that Jungk ami Fabian knew, or
were charge able with not lee, that Cropjier,
Heed, and Scolt owned sheep together at Oasis,
and hud litem tin re when Fablau was present,
that Heed and Crop|>ci nnd .lungk nnd Fnblnu
knowing the facts, induced the surelles to sign
flic notes, nnd fraudulentl> w Unlit hi fiom them
(be double rein Mo n of Scolt, ns iiffectlug their
Intercut nud liability.
If. In obtaining Hie signatures of these defendants to tbe contract of s u i c K s h i p or ns hi
dotners of the Hole* mnde In c ontliiu illon of
theli i<np|iose,| llabiill v. there was nm fi.iudulent coiiceabueiit on the part of Crop|s r nud
Hnsl and Jungk ami F.iblnu or either of said
firms, of any fait or circumstance within their
knowledge or eoncniiliig which tiny were ren
somihry cbaigeablc> with itollcv w h b h materl
nlli niTccbsl nud lucieased the llihlllti and re
siHiiiKlhllll) of llolbr<Mik nud Ihigglits as sun*
l b s oi ludnrxcrs lu those Iraiisai tlmis In whhli
they we ic Kiirc ties nm) oi* tateil to llielr preju
d h e then the Niucllf« should be CIIM Imrgetl
"It has been he Id that Ibe mere uoii<-<iiuuiiiul
cation h\ t h e c i u l l l o r to the sttitti of material
f a i l s within tbe knowledge of tbe c nslltor
whlib the miietj should kisiw nltltoiigli not
willful or liitcutloual cm the p.ut of the < re.lit
or, or wltb u vh w to a d i a u t a g e to himself
will discharge the surety " The ftaud upon
the HUICHCK c-»»us|vt« in (be situation lu which
tbey were placed by the eoudut t of tbe olliei
putties ami not on what was p a c i n g lu their
mii'cls not e\pic>«-Msl but concealed
Upon
this subject. Ilian.lt on Nutetislilp l.-et Hon
l*_1M sa.is " | | I t . i s l H t u b t l d Hill 'one who he
I comes
comes ss u
un
n tt y
y for
for niiotber
niiotber must
must ordltmrlh
onllnnrlU lie
lie

MINRH, J (after Mating the facts)
This
caw wnn twice ltefore tbe territorial court prior io this II)»|M nl
Tbe cases are r e t r i e d in
ft
t tali. 411, H.i I'ac ZM, and 12 I Unit. Lilt, 42
I'ae 2(»2 Ii|ion c a d i <M»«II»-IOII the reeonl dls
IIOMH a somewhat dissimilar state of fat Is
rite enne now presents a somewhat differ
cut Kittle of fncts from those pit Hinted on
the bud ap)H>nl, so far us a p p e a l s ftotn the
opinion remlereil
T h e first ipiCHtlon arises
opon the charge of the court a s g h e n and
the refusal of the court to charge as re
<|t«'*ted In some respects the testimony bear
Nt upon the question Involved Is s o m e w h a t
ludennite »nd uitMitlsfnc torj
l l t e j n r j were
'of Judges of Its weight nud coiiflUHhcucKS.
»nd rmiiitl ngntiiMt the piaiutlfls
'there are
•iiflhlud fntis ,n),| rlniin^liinien disc IOMMI in
the rcsxird rrom u h M i tbe Jmv eon Id infer or
"ml that lungk, I ablaii nnd Scott were pmt
•*w for the pui|Mise of pun basing s i m p and
Hut Jungk and I abliui knew al the time or
**" ihirgi nlile wllb nollis* that St oil was a n i i s m m t l It.' tin MI instil Hit. IH lit f tlt.lt Hit; l*rlim n | t i | I,,,,,,,, , „ I u i | t M I | o r „( |, n „ | m
jransac licit bel wnoil J^IM^ IJIhie tj.nl p tHh-^ H ^
'•^Icsl win, , | M M I ,„ t | „ . | ( l | , i r J M | R r„r the I cniecK t til rjii^ InTiie* ti*injf*oiiiiHo of Tiii^iie - i of
l«»wluise and sale of sheep to them, that Crop I tli.it dest rljitlon, sub'ji c HinJ bint oiilj"7crilie or

308

49 T A C i r i O

IlKruilTBR.

(UUh.

llablllly, w h h h ml({ht Influence the auretle«
In enieihig into the contract, te coneeuleti
to know jj'fltynt •• W,'L '"' J>'^ JL,,,,llJjrliLl|ilL,,'Lll fioiu the fturelle*, or, If knowing the fact
SIK h lufoi iiiatlou In purposely eomealed fro-j,
andIliaTlio'w'llP'i'rn insaill'uiiltHH In* Is In
f.'.iuied Mint Hint' are cxli'iipi'lliianr
the RiiiftlcR, In the Interest of the creditor
sin h ( o u i i a l m e u t , though no ini|iilry In rnade
Milium lift-, ting the risk
To H'"'Kc
m\ kii'MWi to in- m lint; iifton the In lief that t i m e by the s u i e l h s , amnunts to a frnud upon ( Qt
no UIIUMIIIm m,,im in must DM en lit whl.h his "sinfiles, ami would dlHchnrge them from | | a .
"•
..'; ; ~
' " i . A,
i
- • . « « . . . - • H 1 .1 i I . . . . . .
J^llltj
Under all the facts nnd clrctuuHlanrea
Hint there nre KIII lii i h"''"'|MtnlV <>*{ IUUI linv^ "RIIOWII for the consideration of the Jury, Hn<*
iig an o|»|M»ihiiilt^ (Q iiinl^i' Mii'iirtit'i^nViinT l a n e found the fin In ttgnlusl the appellimi,,
•withholding MH in inie-l IM- II KIIIil. I| n»j± hjp»l >\ e llnd no re\erslble etror lu the Instmt Ho lu |
ffiiiiid In whl«it~tli< <-ui.lt ttlli lie ielh~\i>| of the l o m t , nor IH theie any error In reft-.*,
TiThl* tmitnu «.' " It In n|R«» In Id that, lu or- lug to give the Instructions asked by the
i h r to illMhnijre the a u u d ) , Mie nudist lusts I In- plaintiffs
Pi lor to (he trial plaintiff* moved Hie dla
formation should relate to buslm SH width Is
the sublet t of Hiire»3slil|i
Hl<<n s a \ a " I he trh t court of Utah toiiiil) for an onler Iraim
colli I.xt of sin el v liiUMirln enllie good fiillh feu hit: Raid t a u s c for Hlal to Salt h a k e mm,
ami coiiHdi nee bet wet u the pintles In icgnrd to I) 'the motion was bas«s| upon an ntlhhuit
showing Hint pl.iliillffs owned the noles, and
the whole Irnnsiu ll.ui
A m t nimuiim nt of
had resided In Salt Mil
mix slni e l| H y
timurUil fiHln. or a m MiiriM or Implt. I mH
were g h e u , and that Hit > wi ic |»n\abli« at
' renrest'iilallop of Mien, f a i l s , nr aiij limine ml
Salt Lake 'I he motion w a s oxeiruled, nut]
on extepllou taken T h e motion Is based on
tin r In -onnrhe or IM withholdingr proper
hi
pn
elMji,
,|,,
, l l
set Hon T of nith le 21. and set Hon ,r» of artk| e
8. of the tonstlliiHon rialuHITs resided In
;l(iit ground to hnnlldnti' Hie t o n l i a i t .
II|H.II
Salt Ijike (Ml) when l h e \ l o i u u u m e d thin
the w
ground. Hie m s l i l o i R" In aTTsuhst'
at Hon In Hie 1 list dlstilt-t u n l i t In (Mali
quent IraiiMii Hons with (he ilehtor hound to
t o u u l ) , Jiniuaiy Id. I Mill
'| Ida t a s e hml
eipial good fnllh to the s u r d ) ' S i n n
l>|
I wen tried lu that count) three limes prior to
Jur f :{-! I Hunk \ Coo|ier HIM.- tTII.Hiiin.il. the last lilal. w h h h I M t u n e d (). tola i II |H!NI
Bur. | | 4 ID 421; Comstot k v Onge, 01 III
'J he tit feiidauta resided In I'IOXO, Utah conn
3*28; llrnk v Stevens, 3» Me 5.52; Juugk
ly
Seel Ion H of a i l i i l e H or the » OIIHIIIUIIOD
T Heed. O Utah, 411, 33 I'ne 23d, I V t k v IHir
provides, among olhei things, that all civil
rett, 0 I»nnn. 4stl, IMtlent k v lllslmp, 1 IJIW and t rimlnnl husliif-s m l s i u g In a n ) enuuty
Mil Hi. Doughty • S i n n g e 2K ( onu 1 Kt
must be tried lu sin h t o u n t ) , unless a chance
Italllon v M a l l o w * . II) ( link ft V 1> II War
of >enue be taken. In s u t h . IIH'N aa may be
ren v Branch, 15 W \ n 2\
It IH said that
pi in hied by law
Set lion 7 of a r t h l e 21 of
that "text AM to whether Hie illselosuie HIIOIIIII
Ihe loustlliitlon provide*, ninoug other thing*
I HI voluntarily uinde In whethtr t h i i e IH n eon
that all in lions and (aseH pending In the di*
tract iMitiiiii the debtor and eiislltt.r to the
trht nnd Riipieine eouita of the teullory it
elfeit Hint his |HJS|||UU Khali he a different one Hie time Ihe slate is admitted Into the Union
from Mint width the Ninety might ex|H>tl"
Hunll entvut a« ottwrwlse \icu\Uktl, l»e traiw
Hamilton v Watson, 12 Clark A r . \m
feiied lo Ihe supreme court and district courts
T h e s e sureties did not know that Seolt w a s of the Rlate
Se. lion 2 of arthle 21 of the
A partner of each Hi in on the toutiiul < on toiisllliitlou prmlilcR that all laws of Ihe ter
cernliiK which t h e j were sureties, and did not rltoi) now In foice, and not lepuguaul to the
Indorse with Hie knowledge Hint tin \ w u e lonsllliitlou, shall remain In f u u e until tlior
h e m m i n g llnl.le for the nets of Siolt In the
expire of their o » n lludlatlon, or a t e aliens!
iiinnlpiilatlou of the buslm s* of the s o c i a l
or rep. alt d by the IcgM.ituie
Se. Hon 5 of
firm*
I h t y s l g i n d a s MIU'IICR for Cioppcr
in Ih l e 8 o f the loiisllliilloii Is o u h pio-pei live
ami Heed, r e d i n g upon their lutcgill), and
lu lit* opeiallons, and H n i e f o i e does not a|s
not aa Mirclles for f i o p p t r , It* «*«1 and Scott
ply to m lions width w e i c t o m m i u t e d nuJ
W h e n thev Rluned the) were not liitoiuusl
|M nding lu the lenltoii.il i l M i i . t IOIUIH wlien
that a member of Intth Iliiun had laid plans Ihe loii^lllutloii went Into efle<t. A tniifcll
with each bv u h h h th<> HUH His should be
luHonal pio\K)oa should not be toiistiuetl
robbetl. and <'i«>pper mil Itetd mined f»i Ha
Willi a lelioopMlite operation, unless that 1»
lieuellt of one member of the several Hi ins
Ihe uuiiiKtakahle liileulion of the w o i d s u-<tsl
Nor did the M I I . I I I S know thai < toppi-i and
lU.uk, (Vnisl Law, p 71), 1-nd l u t e i p St I
Itrcd and .liiupk nnd I ablali w u e ellla r pas
mat: Watt v Wilghl »MI ( a l Joj. .I Pne 1»,
* l \ e or n e t h e acentM In Mi< It le^ulllng dl(Iiuiiee \ . Suptilm ( unit, r.H I al SS, Teopk!
honeslr
N . l l l u i did the s u n Ih s know that
v Counl) l o i n is of (•land C o , U Colo lUd.
JuiiRk and Fabian km n that Siolt was In
M'hlgh lion Co v l^ower Mm uugle T p . 8 *
teieNted with < loppt r and Ib'ed In the sale
I'a St 4S4
Se. lion 2 of a i l l t l e 21 of t»o
of sheep, nor Hint t'ropiN-r and lb ed knew
lonsilliiHon t o u l l n u i s In f o u e , under tl>«
that Kiolt was lul
l< d with lungk and
Rtale. MII h leiilloihil laws as wen- not re
I ablnn In the p u i i h n s e of sh« < p If a ma
pugnaiil lo It, and Hi. i . b \ makes them stu'«
tertal fait < onu
d with the i o n i u m of
laws. 'JIlls touit uo held lu Whipple v. UeO•ureljuhlp, uud dlitolly affettlng the MUieHciT
llnnry rl»k* attending It; and the pnrty

ftjr-ha "111 1M; iii<H' tl.ilh, Iti-i'inl, vr)
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WRIGHT ?. SOUTHERN PAO. CO.

„ 4fi Tac 271. 13 Utah. 484; PlesRant
t!uTc°«I C o - r- l l o " r d ot Coorra, 48 Vac.
\Jr> 15 U'nh, 07.
Among the l a w s of the
liory then In forco with reference to the
tare ot trial were BCCMOIIS 81U.1 to 3J(H.
f inn I ' n w 8 U , a D 1 8 S S * * * h , c h W P r e o>HOU»l^(i„8
L n w s 1K00. p Ot)) by making these
lion" e««'' 0 » , n t ° , n o u e w comlltloii of
'hliiS* « n , , , , r l , , e ctwiRlMullon
T h e terrltoI | n t was RiiliHt.iuilallj- r e e t i n e l c d after
(IrlklnC out Ihe words "Judhlal d l s l r k l . " and
lulHlinting Hie woitl "county " 'Ihe act wan
p,„o»cd and look effect February 17, IKUtl,
before this motion wan made. This act pro
•WW where casca shall be commenced and
tried s»d when and where Ihey may lie revoscA for tiiul
Set Hon 3IIW p i o \ l d e s that
In nil othei t a s e s the action must la» tried
lg t|,P louiity In which the defendants, or
•otne of them, reside at the commenteineut
of the action" When this action w a s coin
nrnred, the plaintiffs resided In Salt Lake,
Tito
tn<! the defendants In Utah, county.
first district formerly comprised Utah and
tevernl other counties Under the new con
dilution. Utah county Is made distinct by 11*|f The action w a s brought In pursuance
«f Uw In the proper county under the statute
$$ it then existed. T h i s statute w a s conttn
otd In folic until changed by the act of l^XL
Hf ere of the opinion that the district court
ef L'IRII county pioperly assumed Jiirladh Hon
In HIIR itf-p
We And no reversible eiror In
lbs proceedings
1 he judgment of the district tour t Is alllrmed, with costs
7.ANB. O. J , concurs. H A R T ,
Judge, concurs lu the result.
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tSnimme Court ol V5ti»h. June 24. 1807.)
IirrnT IXTIMOIT—Rrvntw ON FOHMI a ArrRAL
— INJI IIT TO b ^t^ iorr—I %u>r-\t r
1 NlirtlifT a WIIIKSII !• nhonn to he qunlifii.l
j# If^iiJv IIH to inn iters of opinion In n pi.lun•imi, IIUX.IHUI fur uif i n n jiiutre to pass upon
tttlir m i l nnd Ins dim n Hon in rmithisive un**i in iiiif.-lly crronemiM as s niattt r of law,
*'i4 tin riniiiing and n'Timi;eiii« ut of loromol"M li *io fnr • part oiilsi.le of thr« cxpeiun. e
•n.l knou I. IKP of or<linnr> jiin.rs as to render
'»|Nrl tiMiiiiuiii) pro|M r and mlmi-MMc
* " w nut iic<.«'«>uy or usiml for the stipn me
"xat to puss upon cnth ami everv ipi. -ima
|»'^"<l on u|i|K d win n the cns«. nt reM rse.|
It is
J""1
t to puss ii|ion NIMI dileriiiine NIH li i|u. •"'""<inis.il mi HM nppiiil as nic ntttssnry to
»* finnl il.driiiiiiHlii.il of the case
»'lhe |M>|><iinli.iu of the p h t e wlure the lnJJI'l lia|i|Hii(.l (In |iro|H)iti«.ii of Hie population
M wire iiiilr.uid impl.^e . ami ihe d IIIMT of
I T . ' " 1 " ' ,»••,, "' , , r '""'"•,«,»',l> t..iiu.it.d
•Jih ||,(> innKiM>; „|, 0 f trabiN. were yuwliou* not
•"••nut to lire int-c na piesented.
WxllikuB |, y tlie lourLI
*l'l>eal from district court, Weber county; II
H««lnp|i, Judge
Anion |»y James Alficd Wright ngilnst Ihe
"'""'•rtj I'atiile Company. Judgmtiit for
••"•Ilff. Deftudant appeals. Ailliuiud.
B
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Marshall A, Ooyle. for apj^llaut
nichanls
& MainiUhm ami A. K Tratl. for rtM|Mindeut.
MINHIt. J. This action was brought to recover damages for persimnl Injuries sustained
by the plniuliff through the alleged negligence
of the defi ixlant In falling to furiiMi a tlreman In addition to the engineer to operate Its
engine, and In the engineer negligent!/ falling
to olit) the signals g h e n , while acting In the
double tap i. l u of engineer and fireman
'I ha
retord shows that the plaintiff was a switchman In the emplo) of the defendant at the time
of the accident
On the morning of Ihe l l t b
day of August. 1»»2. about 1 15 o'clock, lie
was performing his duties as switchman, nnd.
for the puipose of uncoupling them, went lo
b e l w . e a two tars of a freight Main. will, h w a s
standing u|Min a slight grade, so that the links
were drawn tUht. Ih lug unable to uncouple
thi in on account of the gradi. he came out
from between the cats and wlHi his lantern
signaled I he engineer, who performed the duties of llrvinaii as well as engineer, to back up
slowly, and then stepped In ngiln between the
cars to pull the pin the moment the Rlatk came,
and stood with Ids back towards the engine
and one hand ii|mii tbo rung of flic ladder on
the csr In front of him
'| |H> rnglnccr saw and
ohc)cd the signal, but the train came back
with a Jerk, and plaint Iff s right heel w a s
caught and held by the brake beam
He Immediately gras|»ed the rung of the ladder with
his other hand, and signaled the engineer wltb
his lantern to stop, throwing bis lantern out to
one ride. 1 his signal was not seen by the engineer, who at this parlltular moment waa
netessarlly cup igetl In shoveling coal lulo the
flre,-a duty width should have been performed by a lliein.in - a n d the pi ilnllff waa dragged
for some dlstam-e until his hands were Jerked
fioni their hold ii|H.n the ladder, and he waa
thrown \MM1VT the wheels of the caT, wWcn
passed over Ids leg. necessitating Its amputation at a point about ue\en Indies above the
knee
On the trial of the case Mr Doughty waa
called as a witness for the plilntlff. and" gave
testimony tt nding to show that he was Ihe englmer updating the engine at Hie lime of the
nitldent. and had Item so emp|o\cd for about
one year, that he had l>ccn In the employ of
the deft iitlnut eouiptuy s l m e 1HST>. that be
was car Impet tor for the d. fcmlaiit the lli«t
year at C.irlin. bad worked ns helper in the
mntlilue shops for s e t i r a l mouths; work).I a s
tinman on the roul for three y e i r s again a s
i c p i h e r for s e i e r i l years at different points
on Hie road; Hut It was his duly as hel|ier to
take tare of the engines and fix them up. and
in. pare them to go out. since July, 1S!l|, had
(harge of the s w l b h engine, and run It at
nU'ht; t i n t his duty w a s to run the engine
as cnghncr, and do Hie tiring when needed.
No Hitman was furnished on the engine at the
time of the a c i d , nt
'I hereupon the plilnllfl
aMwd the witness the following question:
"Sow, Mr Doufchly, 1 want to aak you. In your

